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The End of Corporate Governance Law:
Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the
Top
Steven A. Ra. irezt
The pernicious influence of politics continues to pollute corporate
governance applicable to public corporations in the United States. In
particular,the political process has yielded a corporate governance regime
that simultaneously imposes excessive regulatory costs and impairs investor
confidence. CEOs continue to enjoy too much autonomy over the public
corporation.Increasingly, empiricalevidence shows that corporategovernance
standardsin the U.S. are sub-optimal. This Articleproposes to change the legal
structure by which corporate governance standards are articulated.Using the
Federal Reserve Board as a model, this Article urges the creation of a
depoliticized federal agency with authority over an optional federal regime
selected by shareholders.As such, corporategovernance would be based upon
market verdicts and the best corporate governance science rather than
institutions (legislatures,courts, and the SEC), which are poorly equipped to
impose standardsbased upon science insteadofpolitical caprice.

Introduction ......................................................................................................
1.

The Problems of Corporate Governance ..............................................
A.
B.
C.

314
320

SOX: A Case Study of Regulatory Dysfunction............................. 321
The Problems of CorporateFederalism ....................................... 325
The Emergence of CEO Primacy.................................................. 329

II.

The Emerging Science of Corporate Governance ................................ 335

III.

Toward a Federal Reserve of Corporate Governance ........................... 347

IV .

Conclusion ............................................................................................

358

t Steven A. Ramirez is a Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago, where he is also the
Director of the Loyola Business and Corporate Governance Law Center. Questions regarding this
Article may be addressed to me at sramir3@luc.edu. I presented an earlier draft of this article at a
Loyola University Chicago School of Law faculty workshop. I thank Associate Dean for Research
Spencer Walter for coordinating that very productive presentation. I am also grateful to Loyola
University Chicago for supporting this work through a summer research stipend. Aimee E. Dreiss
provided excellent research assistance.

HeinOnline -- 24 Yale J. on Reg. 313 2007

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 24:2, 2007

Introduction
There are growing signs from a broad spectrum of sources that corporate
governance for publicly held companies in the United States is dysfunctional.
In a related work, I have argued that the core problem with corporate
governance in the United States is the political influence wielded by
management. 1 A chorus of voices now recognizes that the political power of
CEOs has naturally led to a system of CEO primacy. 2 Legendary mutual fund
founder John Bogle asserts that a "pathological mutation" has transmogrified
corporate governance from "traditional owners' capitalism to the new
managers' capitalism." 3 Prominent business commentator Robert J. Samuelson
claims that CEOs have "contrived ... a moral code that justifies grabbing as
much as they can."' 4 Harvard Business School Professor D. Quinn Mills posits
that "CEOs used their enormous power . . . to enrich themselves at the expense
of investors." Recent events lend support to these views.
The widening scandal over backdated options grants, revolving around
whether "incentive" compensation plans were in fact rigged games designed to
enrich officers at the expense of shareholders, indicates that the law has not
sufficiently constrained management. 6 Meanwhile, CEO compensation at
America's leading public corporations continues to soar.7 At least some legal
I Steven A. Ramirez, The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End of Corporate
Governance Law, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. - (forthcoming 2007).
2

See, e.g., D. QUINN

MILLS,

WHEEL,

DEAL AND STEAL: DECEPTIVE ACCOUNTING,

DECEITFUL CEOs, AND INEFFECTIVE REFORMS 183 (2003) ("CEOs have found a way to enormously
increase their own wealth by a variety of means in a period in which shareholders have been losing their
shirts....
[T]he core of the problem faced by investors today, as revealed by corporate scandals, is that
investors must be better protected from CEOs."). The former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
Alan Greenspan (at the time, arguably the most powerful economist in the nation), has echoed those
voices that are concerned about the ascendancy of CEO power. Testimony of Chairman Alan
Greenspan, Federal Reserve Board's Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002), availableat
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2002/july/testimony.htm (stating that lax boards had
contributed to a CEO-centric corporate power structure that permitted senior executives to "harvest"
gains through manipulation of share prices).
3

JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 28 (2005).

4

Robert J. Samuelson, Delinquency of the CEOs, WASH. POST, July 13, 2006, at A23.

5

MILLS, supranote 2, at 6.

6
The Wall Street Journalmaintains an options backdating scorecard which lists the names of
companies ensnared and the nature of the probes. Perfect Payday: Options Scorecard, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html.
As of this
writing, the FBI has disclosed fifty-two inquiries and the SEC was pursuing more than 100. Stephen
Taub, FBI Probing52 Companies Over Backdating,CFO.COM, Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfmf7962096/c_7961008?f='hometodayinfinance; see also Liz Moyer, Who's Next in the
Crosshairs?, FORBES.COM, Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.forbes.eom/business/2006/08/09/optionscrosshairs-backdating-cxjmIra0810options.html.
7
In 2004 and 2005, CEO compensation at large American corporations continued to reach
ever increasing heights. See, e.g., Gary Strauss & Barbara Hansen, CEO Pay Soars in 2005 as a Select
Group Break the $100 Million Mark, USA TODAY, Apr. 11, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/co-
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scholars have traced the roots of "CEO primacy" in American corporate
governance to certain key legal changes in the 1980s and 1990s. 8 The cost of
such CEO primacy to the economy and shareholders is huge. 9 Moreover, the
costs of a system that permits a dictatorship of the CEO are not limited only to
the most egregious companies, as the perception of inadequate checks as a
matter of law on CEO power is bound to erode investor confidence generally
and lead to a higher cost of capital for American business. 10
Other scholars raise different concerns, focusing instead on the costs of
the Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX") reforms. 1 Professors Butler and Ribstein claim
that the SOX reforms were a "costly mistake" that have imposed net costs of
$1.1 trillion and were enacted in a "regulatory panic."' 12 Professor Roberta
Romano asserts that SOX was "ill-conceived" and contrary to the best learning
available at the time.' 3 SOX has resulted in real benefits, and the Act is
certainly not without its fans. 14 Nevertheless,5 overall it, too, seems to have
resulted in a higher cost of capital in America.'

mpanies/management/2006-04-09-ceo-compensation-report-x.htm (stating that compensation for CEOs
at America's 100 largest corporations soared 25% in 2005 and 25% in 2004).
8
See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 343, 344 n.10 (2006)
(attributing CEO primacy to the death of the duty of care, the "reform" of the federal securities laws to
protect managers from private litigation, and management's continued domination of the proxy
mechanism); Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 113-15
(2004) (stating that lax state fiduciary duties contributed to a "dramatic increase in the ratio of the
compensation of the corporate CEO to that of the average corporate blue collar employee" from 42:1 in
1980 to 475:1 in 2000).
9
See M. P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Executive Stock Options (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/symposium/docs/narayanan.pdf (finding
that backdated options at eighty-nine sampled companies resulted in an average of $500,000 in extra
compensation for executives per firm while costing shareholders at each company $400 million in
market capitalization). "Recent research has established that many executives exert not only legal
influence over their compensation, but also illegal influence in many cases." Id. at 75-76. "[O]ur
evidence suggests that managerial theft is not a zero-sum game, but involves huge dead-weight losses
for the shareholders." Id. at 76.
10
To the extent the public associates opportunistic behavior with weak corporate governance,
then the cost of capital is likely to rise nationwide, impairing macroeconomic performance. See Mark J.
Garmaise & Jun Liu, Corruption,Firm Governance,and the Cost of Capital,Anderson Graduate School
of Management Working Paper, Feb. 28, 2005, available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/anderson/fin/l05 (finding that weak shareholder rights are associated with a higher volatility risk-and therefore a
higher cost of capital-in a transnational empirical analysis, impairing macroeconomic performance).
II
I do not intend to claim that all scholarly assessments of SOX are uniformly negative. I do
not even claim that federal intervention was an inappropriate response to the corporate fiascoes that
surfaced commencing with the failure of Enron Corporation. See Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both of
Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficiency of Mandatory
Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 355 (2003) ("Sarbanes-Oxley was a measured and
appropriate response to the abject failures in U.S. corporate governance typified by Enron.").
12
HENRY N..BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT
WE'VE LEARNED; HOW TO Fix IT 3 (2006).

13
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005).
14
Stephen Wagner & Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits ofSarbanes-Oxley, HARV. Bus.
REV., Apr. 2006, at 133, 140 (stating that SOX has improved the operations of corporate America).
15
See supra notes 9, 10, 12; infra notes 16, 17, 19,20,21.
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A rising cost of equity capital in the United States since mid-2002 appears
to be driving companies to eschew public capital markets in favor of private
debt. 16 This trend risks more severe economic contractions and is stunting the
development of public capital markets,' 7 which have universally been
associated with superior economic performance.1 8 Indeed, the United States
has lost its position as the leading equity capital market, and now lags both
Great Britain and China in terms of initial public offerings (IPOs) of
securities. 19 The United States's share of IPOs has declined from 50% in 2000
to 5% in 2005.2 o This increased cost of capital is likely due to increased
compliance costs stemming from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
2 of 2002, as well as a
relative loss of investor confidence in the United States. '
The common thread between those arguing that corporate governance in
the United States has harmed investor confidence and those arguing that the
system has imposed regulatory costs that are too high is politics. In other
words, compliance costs are unnecessarily high and CEOs are largely
unplugged from legal constraints because of politics. Therefore, the solution to
the problems of corporate governance should involve depoliticization. 22 This
Article argues for an end to the means by which corporate governance law is
promulgated today, in favor of a structure that can operate to optimize
corporate governance, and thereby stem the
economic losses associated with a
23
suboptimal corporate governance regime.
Specifically, this Article proposes a new depoliticized administrative
agency for the promulgation of corporate governance standards, which would
rely upon markets as well as emerging economic and financial science to

16
In the Shadows of Debt, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2006, at 79 ("Since 2003, the after tax cost
of raising debt has been much lower than the cost of issuing shares, even in the more expensive highyield market.").
17
Id. at 80.
18
See, e.g., Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on
Capital Markets Regulation, at ix (2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/ 11.30Committee_lnterimReportREV2.pdf ("[Tlhere is considerable evidence that countries with better financial
markets, like the United States, enjoy more rapid economic growth, which creates more new jobs
nationwide. The U.S. legal and regulatory regimes that promote accountability, disclosure, and
transparency are an important element in the success of U.S. capital markets.").
19
Alex Halperin, New York: No Longer the IPO King, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Dec. 27, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.con-/investor/content/dec2006/pi20061227_944762.htm.
20
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, supra note 18, at x.
21
Id. atx.
22
See Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing FinancialRegulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
503, 504 (2000) (finding that "the Federal Reserve Board's administration of monetary policy
exemplifies the possibility of depoliticizing regulation" in that it regulates effectively in the general
public interest, and is not beholden to special interest influence).
23
Optimal corporate governance would consist of those laws, regulations, disclosure
requirements, and contractual provisions that would serve to maximize benefits from the alignment of
interests between investors and managers net of compliance, regulatory, and other transaction costs.
Thus, optimal corporate governance would minimize net agency costs. See, e.g., John E. Core et al., Is
U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1160-61
(2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)).
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optimize corporate governance applicable to public companies. 24 A
depoliticized regulatory structure is necessary to assure that the agency

responsible for corporate governance is resistant to special interest influence
and can instead operate to place corporate governance upon a scientific
foundation. 25 The standards articulated by the agency would be subjected to a
market test that would allow shareholders to have a direct voice in the system
of corporate governance applicable to their corporation, which would vindicate
shareholder primacy rhetoric. 26 This system should create constant pressure for
improving corporate governance standards-in other words, for a race to the
top among all competing jurisdictions to provide optimal models of corporate
governance for public companies. 27 Courts, state legislatures, and politicized
regulatory agencies would be displaced by an expert administrative agency
subject to market tests and resistant to special interest influence. 28 In short, this

Article proposes an administrative agency with a depoliticized structure (akin
to the Federal Reserve Board or the "Fed") with control over a federal

incorporation regime that shareholders may select.

24
Publicly held companies are: (I) those companies or corporations traded on a national
securities exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange; and (2) those with 500 or more shareholders
and $10 million or more in assets. 15 U.S.C. § 7 81(g) (2004) (describing characteristics of companies
required to register securities with the SEC); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2006) (SEC exemption for certain
companies). Public corporations are the central economic institution in the United States, as they
command a total market capitalization of more than $16 trillion. See Wilshire Assoc., Fundamental
Characteristics
of the Wilshire 5000, http://www.wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000/Characteristics.html. As such they are the primary store of investment capital in the United States.
25
Ramirez, supra note 23, -at 553 ("The Fed thus demonstrates [that] important financial
regulation can be secured against the pernicious influences of special interests. Benefits of expertise,
regulatory flexibility and stability of policy can [also] be secured.").
26
See id. at 549 (noting that Fed independence is supported by markets). Shareholder primacy
has long been the rhetorical value upon which corporate governance is constructed. See, e.g., Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 19.9) ("A business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders."). My focus on shareholder empowerment builds upon
Professor Lucian Bebchuk's proposals. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Casefor IncreasingShareholder
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 913 (2005) (proposing that shareholders satisfying some minimum
holding requirement should have the power to place on the ballot initiatives to change the state of
incorporation). However, as will be shown, Professor Bebchuk's approach would give shareholders a
wealth of choices among regimes polluted by special interest influence, just as both state and federal
systems today have fallen prey to such power. Additionally, I am skeptical of Professor Bebchuk's
proposal because it has no mechanism for assuring that sophisticated empirical studies from the
emerging science of corporate governance would be manifest in the articulation of corporate governance
standards.
27
I argued in 2000 that the primary factor impedeing a race to the top in American corporate
governance was the inability of shareholders to judge competing systems or elements of corporate
governance. Ramirez, supra note 22, at 572.
28
For example, Arthur Levitt, the Chairman of the SEC during the 1990s, has catalogued his
efforts to quell CEO power over corporate governance issues, and the power of special interests to
frustrate his efforts. ARTHUR LEVITr, TAKE ON THE STREET 106-15 (2002) (recounting how the
"business lobby" and "CEOs" successfully used Congress and the SEC to thwart an effort by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board to require that options be expensed on corporate income
statements).
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At least since William Cary's landmark 1974 article, Federalism and
CorporateLaw. Reflections on Delaware,29 there has been a running debate,

among legal academics, economists, finance professors, and others regarding
the proper role for the federal government in the area of corporate
governance. 30 On one side of this debate are those arguing that state lawmakers
seek to enhance their tax revenues from dispensing corporate charters by
providing otherwise sub-optimal corporate governance standards that are
indulgent to managers, who currently make incorporation decisions.31 On the
other are those claiming that capital markets would punish corporations
hobbled by sub-optimal corporate governance, and therefore neither states nor
managers would pursue such standards; instead, market competition assures
that there is a race to the top, whereby states compete to offer ever more
optimal corporate governance. 32 This Article seeks a synthesis of these

positions, and attempts to forge an optimal regulatory structure for specifying
corporate governance standards based upon this synthesis. I argue that

corporate governance law can be responsive to market action (and shareholder
choice) under the guidance of a depoliticized administrative agency charged
with promulgating optimized corporate governance for publicly held companies

based upon the best emerging finance and economic science.33

29
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 696-705 (1974) (advocating minimum federal standards for corporate governance for publicly held
companies).
30
As early as 1933, authorities recognized that state competition for charters could lead to
regulatory "laxity," as corporations sought charters in more permissive states and states indulged
corporations in search of franchise revenues. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31
See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1820-21 (2002) (finding that the empirical record does not support the
conclusion that state competition for incorporations yields optimal corporate law outcomes); Comment,
Lawfor Sale: A Study of the Delaware CorporationLaw of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 861-62 (1969)
("Delaware is in the business of selling its corporation law" and it therefore "tries to give the [CEO]
what he wants. In fact, those who will buy the product are not only consulted about their preferences,
but are also allowed to design the product and run the factory.").
32

See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-16 (1993)

(stating that empirical evidence shows that choice among jurisdictions for incorporation benefits rather
than harms shareholders); Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 276 (1977) ("So far as the capital market is concerned, it is not in
the interest of management to seek out a corporate legal system which fails to protect investors, and the
competition between states for charters is generally a competition as to which legal system provides an
optimal return to both interests.").
33
Compare Harold Demsetz, The Firm in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution, 87 AM.
ECON. REV. 426 (1997) (stating that under "neoclassical theory" the firm is a "black box" in that its
functioning is assumed to be optimal) with M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, The Emergence of
Corporate Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings
Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk, 38 FIN. REV. 1, 12-13 (2003) (giving an
overview of empirical evidence regarding diversity in governance associated with superior financial
performance). Given the recent vintage of corporate governance science, and the fact that few
legislators, regulators, and judges have interdisciplinary facility, it is somewhat understandable that
much of its learning has not influenced corporate governance law. See Stacey Kole & Kenneth Lehn,
Deregulation,the Evolution of CorporateGovernance Structure, and Survival, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 421,
421 (1997) (stating that as of 1997 "[m]uch of the literature on corporate governance" took a "Darwinian
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As such, this Article urges scholars to rethink the system by which
corporate governance is promulgated rather than try to divine the substance of
optimal corporate governance, as courts, legislatures, and the SEC currently do

today. 34 Getting regulatory incentives right is just as important as getting

private incentives right, and in the field of corporate governance there is
compelling evidence that incentives are distorted, at both the federal and state
levels. 35 To the extent there are manifest deficiencies in our integrated system

of corporate governance (arising from state incorporation laws and federal
regulation of public companies), there is a need for optimized regulatory
structures that can operate to move our system toward optimized corporate
governance on a continuous basis through market action. 36 In other words, the
thesis of this Article is that market action can assure that corporate governance
moves inexorably toward optimality. This Article seeks to articulate such a
mechanism. 37 Lawyers can create a unified regulatory structure that puts
corporate governance in the hands of specialists capable of interpreting the
science of corporate governance and using market pressure to create a
scientifically based standard of corporate governance, as they did for monetary
policy through the creation of the Federal Reserve Board.38
Part I of this Article shows that, as presently structured, the law permits
inappropriate political influence to subvert corporate governance in the United
States. Viewing federal and state regulation as a whole shows that agency costs
and compliance costs have not been minimized under either federal or state
law. Instead, the entire system responds to political power more than economic

or financial science. While this analysis includes an assessment of the best and
most current learning on the race-to-the-bottom/race-to-the-top debate, I argue
that competition between states for chartering of public corporations is only
one means by which corporate governance standards are distorted. An

view" in that surviving firms are "presumed to have optimal governance structures" leading to an
"absence of evidence" regarding optimal governance structures).
34
See, e.g., Romano, supra note 13, at 1529-40 (demonstrating that Sarbanes-Oxley reforms
rest on a weak empirical basis in terms of the science of corporate governance). Corporate scholars
recognize that the federal securities laws are an essential element of the system of corporate governance
in the United States, particularly with respect to the disclosure obligations of management of publicly
held companies. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 909-10 (2003) (stating that "we now have a
functional division of monitoring between the state and federal governments").
35
See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors'
Fiduciary Duty through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. REV. 393,451,456 (2005) (concluding that current
regime of essentially no liability for directors is "defective" and that "Enron suggests that the costs of
eliminating liability completely and thereby allowing corporate malfeasance to go unchecked are simply
unacceptable").
36
See, e.g., Andrew Parker, It Is Time for a Transfer of Power?, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug.
4, 2005, at 10 (stating that ferocious opposition from corporate CEOs had stifled proxy reform, leading
to management power over the director selection process and higher compensation).
37
See ROMANO, supra note 32, at 149 (concluding that corporate federalism creates constant
incentives for the improvement of corporate governance standards).
38
The Fed was created in the wake of the Panic of 1907, and its modem structure was refined
in the wake of the Great Depression. Ramirez, supra note 22, at 523-29.
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assessment of the propriety of corporate governance regulation at the federal
level (where there is no argument of any race) is also important to whether
politics is corrupting corporate governance.
Part II introduces and reviews the emerging science of corporate
governance, with a view towards assessing outcomes of the current regulatory
structure governing the means by which the duties and obligations of managers
are defined. Part II demonstrates the inferiority of the current regulatory regime
in achieving optimal corporate governance standards. The conclusions of both
Part I and Part II are fully consistent: The United States is in peril of becoming
a second world nation in terms of corporate governance. Our current system
does not reflect the best learning available.
Part III proposes a solution to this problem that seeks to displace politics
in favor of specific mechanisms for making use of the best corporate
governance science. Specifically, Part III attempts to articulate an optimized
regulatory and market structure for achieving optimized corporate governance.
Central to this proposal is the creation of an expert and specialized regulatory
agency with a depoliticized structure on par with the Fed. Part III further argues
that shareholders of publicly held companies should hold an option to annually
select a federal charter that supplants the operation of any state corporate
governance standards in favor of the optimized structure promulgated by the
depoliticized federal agency. This will assure that agency and compliance costs
are minimized and that the cost of capital is reduced. It will create a market
driven model for continuous corporate governance evolution in the direction of
scientifically based standards. Because they are ultimately based upon an
incomplete diagnosis, proposals for reform that do not advocate similar
depoliticization will not meet with success. Simply put, if politics is what ails
corporate governance, then depoliticization is the only remedy.
The Article concludes that corporate governance should be committed to
the discretion of a more institutionally capable agency that is more insulated
from special interest influence. No more should these standards be left to rentseeking legislators, non-expert judges, and a federal regulatory system overrun
by special interest influence.
I.

The Problems of Corporate Governance

Historically, corporate governance in the United States has been left to the
states, and Delaware has appropriated the role of providing corporate
39
governance standards for about half of all American publicly held companies.
39
See Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sPolitics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2493-94 (2005) (arguing
that although "Delaware writes most state corporate law," the federal government is poised to intervene
in a way that limits the autonomy of Delaware lawmakers and interest groups). Corporations are
permitted to incorporate in any state, and when they incorporate within a state the internal affairs
doctrine will operate to direct courts to the substantive law of that state for virtually all corporate
governance issues, other than those governed by federal law. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 201 (9th ed. 2005). More than fifty percent of

all publicly traded corporations have selected Delaware as their state of incorporation, and Delaware is
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Despite this, the federal government has intervened in corporate governance
when investor confidence has eroded to such a level that macroeconomic
instability results or is threatened. 40 This part of this Article seeks to
demonstrate that both federal and state regulation is held hostage to special

interest influence, leading simultaneously to higher compliance costs and lower
investor confidence.
A.

SOX: A Case Study ofRegulatory Dysfunction
A recent example of federal intervention into corporate governance is the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). 4 1 SOX enhanced white collar crime
42

4

sanctions, extended the statute of limitations for securities fraud actions,43
and banned loans to senior executives. 44 Still, for the vast majority of CEOs,
SOX had limited impact on the power of the CEO over the corporation. a The

Act did not significantly alter the balance of power within the corporation
between CEOs and shareholders, beyond the audit function.46 CEO primacy
survived SOX. 4 7 Nevertheless, SOX was the most invasive federal intervention
48
into traditionally state-regulated corporate governance since the New Deal.

now dependent on the franchise fees generated from dispensing charters; such fees constitute 20% of the
state's tax revenue. Id. at 202. Management essentially exercises autonomy over the state of
incorporation. Id.
40
The reason for federal financial regulation is macroeconomic, not microeconomic, failure....
The Fed was created in the wake of the Panic of 1907, and the SEC was created in the wake of
the Great Depression; both of these events are notable for their macroeconomic consequences,
not evidence of some flaw in the efficient market hypothesis.
Steven A. Ramirez, Fearand Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of Investor Confidence,
42 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 40-41 (2002) (citation omitted).
41
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
7201 (2006)).
42
§ 905.
43
§ 804.
44
§ 402(a).
45
For example, the only new obligation imposed upon CEOs is the certification of financial
statements and internal controls. §§ 404, 906.
46
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act excluded management from control over the audit function, by
requiring an independent audit committee. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 204, 301 (requiring an
independent audit committee for public companies). It created an entirely new regulator for auditors of
public companies. §§ 101-09 (creating the "Public Accounting Oversight Board" to regulate audit firms
of public companies). It also imposed new federal rules of professional responsibility for attorneys
"appearing or practicing before the Commission" on behalf of public companies. § 307 (directing SEC
to promulgate rules governing the conduct of attorneys "appearing or practicing before the
Commission"). These are the provisions that invaded traditional state law based corporate governance
most substantively; other than securing the integrity of audits, however, none of these provisions
significantly subverts the autonomy of the CEO.
47
The Act did create new pressures for independent directors. In addition to requiring each
member of the audit committee to be independent of management, the SEC's rules under section 307 of
the Act create an optional qualified Legal Compliance Committee, which provides for a central role for
independent directors. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k) (2006). But the Act defines independence in a relatively
modest way. An independent director may not receive any compensation from the issuer other than
board fees and may not be affiliated with the issuer. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301(B). A final
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As such, SOX continues a pattern of special interest influence at the

federal level, even if punctuated by public cries for reform.4 9 The corporate
corruption crisis that commenced with the failure of Enron in late 2001, and
climaxed with the hurried passage of SOX in mid-2002, shows how excessive
political influence can distort corporate governance.

Events following the

enactment of SOX reinforced this view as special interest influence operated in
the wake of the Act to blunt much of its sting. 5 1 In fact, the ink was not dry on
SOX when President Bush used a signing statement to protect incumbent
managers. 52 Thus, leading investor advocates now believe, notwithstanding

SOX, that the American public corporation is a "dictatorship" of the CEO.5 3

source of increased pressure for independent board members are rule changes at the New York Stock
Exchange and the NASDAQ that apply to companies listed on those markets, with the approval of the
SEC. See generally Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1159, 1170-75 (2005).
48
See Seligman, supra note 47, at 1159 (calling the Sarbanes-Oxicy Act and associated
reforms at the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ Marketplace a "modest revolution").
49
One such example of this special interest domination at the federal level is the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and
Reform in PrivateSecurities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1055, 1084 (1999) ("The recent 'reforms' of private securities litigation are a betrayal
of several fundamental goals of the federal securities laws and expose our financial system to risks that
are not fully appreciated.").
50
An example of corporate influence operating to stymie reform occurred shortly after the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, when the SEC attempted to reform the rules governing proxy voting for
shareholders in a public corporation. See, e.g., Amy Borrus, SEC Reforms.: Big Biz Says Enough
Already, Bus. WK., Feb. 2, 2004, at 43 (detailing the efforts of corporate mangers to stifle proxy
reform); Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee, A Legacy That May Not Last, BUS. WK., June 13, 2005, at 38
(discussing business lobbying efforts to frustrate proxy reform). Consequently, the entire SarbanesOxley reform effort (including associated reforms in corporate governance at the New York Stock
Exchange and the NASDAQ Marketplace) has left CEOs in virtual unfettered control of the machinery
of so-called corporate democracy. See Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of "Corporate
Democracy": Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 735, 767 (2003)
("For all the current talk of corporate governance reform, corporate democracy remains a myth."). See
also Parker, supra note 36 (noting proposed proxy reforms faced fierce opposition from the business
community).
51
Professor Lynn Turner, former SEC chief accountant, asserts that the Bush Administration
kept former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt on in order to continue to further the goals of special interests
and to minimize the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Tim Reason, Two Weeks in January,CFO MAG.,
Mar. 1, 2003, at 75, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3008446/c 3046587?f=insidecfo
(quoting Lynn Turner as saying that "[i]t's becoming more and more clear to investors that the
Administration kept Pitt in place to get done what the special interests wanted, which was to minimize
Sarbanes-Oxley as much as possible").
52
Compare Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing H.R. 3763, 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 543, 2002 WL 31046071 ("[T]he legislative purpose of section 1514A ...is to protect
against company retaliation for lawful cooperation with investigations ... not to define the scope of
investigative authority." Thus, the President decided to "construe section 1514A(a)(1)(B) as referring to
investigations authorized by the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives and conducted for a
proper legislative purpose."), with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806(a), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(l)(B) (2006)) (providing whistleblowers protection against
retaliation for providing information to "(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress").
53
See BOGLE, supra note 3, at 29-30.

HeinOnline -- 24 Yale J. on Reg. 322 2007

Optimizing Regulatory Structures
Congress passed the Act with one eye on the elections of 2002.54 After the

failure of Enron in late 2001 and WorldCom in mid-2002 (followed by a parade
of other instances of corporate corruption),55 financial markets were in the

throes of a meltdown. 56 Politicians in both parties feared facing reelection

without acting to stem any brewing financial panic. 57 Republicans in particular
seemed anxious to avoid being tarred as beholden to a tainted business sector.58

The political impetus behind SOX became irresistible and the Act passed the
Senate by a vote of 99-0. 5 1 An initially reluctant President Bush signed the Act
on July 30, 2002.60
' 62
61
Indeed, commentators have used terms such as "panic" or "mad dash
to describe the haste that marked the passage of SOX in July of 2002. 63 These
64
circumstances were hardly conducive to thoughtful legislative deliberation.
As Professor Romano has asserted, "SOX stands as an exemplar of low-quality
legislative decisionmaking in the context of a crisis .
,,65 In fact, many of the
key elements of SOX were hardly debated at all in Congress, seemed to have
little public salience (and thus analysis), and were swiftly passed pursuant to an
expedited legislative process. 6 6 Moreover, many of the Act's innovations had
been implemented by Enron, meaning that Congress knew the Act would have
limited efficacy. 67 Congress is not institutionally adept at applying the best

See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 14.
55
See MILLS, supranote 2, at 13-24 (highlighting scandals at thirteen companies).
56
See Ramirez, supra note 40, at 31 (showing that the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 700
points in one 48 hour period and 1000 points over one week during mid-July of 2002).
57
Indeed, the market gained 500 points on the day the Conference Committee approved SOX.
See Ramirez, supra note 40, at 35 n.28.
58
See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 14.
59
Id. at 16.
60
See Ramirez, supranote 40, at 31-35.
54

61

BUTLER&RIBSTEIN, SUpra note 12, at 18.

62
Carolyn Lochhead, Bush to Sign Corporate Crackdown: GOP Drops Opposition, Backs
Tougher Version, S.F. CHRON., July 25, 2002, at Al.
63
Romano, supra note 13, at 1602 ("In the frantic political environment in which SOX was
enacted, legislators adopted proposals of policy entrepreneurs with neither careful consideration nor
assimilation of the literature at odds with the policy prescriptions.").
64
As Professor Romano writes:
[l]In the wake of additional revelations of accounting irregularities at WorldCom, its
subsequent bankruptcy filing, and the continued tanking of the stock market [m]embers of
Congress feared that there might be additional revelations of corporate misconduct that would
further depress the market and make corporate scandals a potent reelection issue.
Id. at 1567.
65
Id. at 1544.
66
Id. at 1566 ("Limited consideration and quick floor passage of the bill curtailed partisan
debate and shifted discussion of the issues out of the public spotlight. Electoral concerns were thereby
addressed at the cost of a comprehensive consideration of the implications of the legislation."). See also
BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 17-20.
67
See Janis Sarra, Rose Colored Glasses, Opaque Financial Reporting, and Investor Blues:
Enron As Con and the Vulnerability of Canadian Corporate Law, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 715, 728
(2002) (stating that 13 of 15 Enron directors were independent); Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes
Great Boards Great, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2002, at 106-08 (contending, for example, that many of
the most notable corporate failures had independent boards); see also Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs
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financial and economic learning regarding corporate governance to the
legislative process due to the range of issues it must address in the ordinary
course of its business, the consequent limited opportunities for full debate, and
its intensely politicized environment.6 8 The rush to enact SOX in the shadow of
an election did not enhance its institutional functioning and resulted in an Act
that imposed significant compliance costs with too few positive benefits in
terms of enhanced investor confidence. 69

Thus, SOX is best viewed as the subordination of sound policy to interest
group politics. Public choice theory generally holds that those with economic
power will have decisive influence over the shape of regulation. 70 Corporate
governance increasingly benefits narrow interest groups at the expense of

public investors: "Politics, not economics, determines which corporate
governance devices are favored and which are not." 7 1 For example, because
SOX makes access to public capital more expensive, it favors established

businesses over smaller insurgent businesses.

Another powerful winner was

the auditing industry which anticipated a surge of revenues as a result of
SOX. 73 Combined with a favorable reform moment, these interests were able to

guide the reform effort in ways that4 protected their interests rather than
vindicating the general public interest. Most importantly, the Act failed to
reduce CEO power, as evidenced by the continued upward trajectory of
executive compensation. 75 Yet, the inferior outcome yielded by the SOX
reform effort is a predictable consequence of the inferior mechanisms that
determine corporate governance elements in the absence of federal
intervention. 76 Simply stated, an inferior corporate governance regime can be

Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in America's Boardrooms and What To Do
About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1584 n.3 (2004) (demonstrating that SOX failed to impose real
board independence). Enron also had a financial expert on its audit committee, as required by SOX. See
Dan Feldstein, The Fall ofEnron, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2002, at Al (discussing the fact that the chair
of the Enron audit committee was a former Dean of the Stanford Business School).
68
Romano, supra note 13, at 1544.
69
See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 12, at 3. See also Romano, supra note 13, at 1594
(stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's corporate governance reforms were costly and "poorly
conceived"); Enron 's Legacy, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2006, at A8 ("Congress, as usual, ran off in panic
and whooped through Sarbanes-Oxley, the intrusive accounting law that has cost the U.S. economy far
more than predicted by its backers. Sarbox has added hundreds of billions of dollars in compliance costs,
and for no clear public gain."). Almost immediately upon its passage commentators expressed doubt that
the Act would adequately secure investor confidence. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 40, at 64 (stating
that SOX may turn out to be a "political fraud").
70
BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 13 ("It is ironic that some of the biggest winners
from SOX have been those whose gatekeeping failures triggered the law in the first place.... Public
choice economics suggests.., that the intent of SOX should be inferred from its consequences.").
71
Id. at 13-14 (quoting Prof. Jonathan R. Macey).
72
Id. at 12-13.
73
Id. at 13.
74
See id. at 9-16.
75
See supranote 7.
76
See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2004) (arguing that
federal law operates to constrain the autonomy of state corporate governance authorities).
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expected to lead to hurried federal intervention that is driven
too much by
77
politics rather than the best financial and economic science.
B.

The Problems of CorporateFederalism

The race-to-the-top/race-to-the-bottom debate has evolved in the backdrop
of the federal regulatory dynamic illustrated by SOX. 78 Few have tied the two

together as part of a singular special interest dynamic. 79 Yet, there is no logical
basis for segregating the activity at the state level of corporate governance from
activity at the federal level.80 Directors and officers are more interested in the
substance of law and regulations governing their conduct than the source of
such standards. 81 It is true that there is a greater wealth of empirical analysis
regarding the race-to-the-top/race-to-the-bottom debate from the perspective of
state law. 82 But, if managers use special influence in one arena to dilute their
duties, it is only logical that they would seek to do so in the other. 83 Thus, an
integrated view of the evidence is a more efficacious method of assessing the
optimality of the current corporate governance regime. 84 This integrated view
of all the evidence leads to the conclusion that whatever competitive force may
exist to move corporate governance in any direction, both the state and federal
systems are subject to dangerous special interest raids that compromise the

Obviously, SOX is the best example of this dynamic. See supra notes 11-12 and
77
accompanying text. Financial crises invariably lead to federal intervention. Ramirez, supra note 40, at
34. See also Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH.
U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997) (finding that scandals and market disruptions generally lead to new financial
legislation).
78
Some scholars contend that the states compete for corporate charters by indulging
managers with lax governance standards, with the hope of generating enhanced tax revenues. See supra
notes 30-31. Other commentators suggest that competition among states leads to pressure from states to
provide optimal governance standards so that corporations incorporated in a given state will attract
capital at a lower cost. See supra note 32.
In 2000, 1 stated that viewing financial regulation from a "transcendent" perspective,
79
involving an analysis of both state and federal law, showed that as then structured our system of
corporate governance regulation "face[d] grave difficulties acting in the public interest." Ramirez, supra
note 22, at 584.
There is powerful evidence that the dilution of investor remedies under the federal
80
securities laws (pursuant to the PSLRA) was the product of special interest influence. See Ramirez,
supra note 49, at 1087 n.156 (demonstrating that lobbying and campaign contributions fueled the
political effort to eviscerate private securities litigation); see also MILLS, supra note 2, at 45, 87.
81
Indeed, managers and their associated interest groups have used federal law to preempt
state law not to their liking, and have used their influence to change federal law not to their liking. See
Ramirez, supra note 49, at 1059 n.13.
Compare Robert Daines, Does DelawareLaw Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525
82
(2001) (finding evidence that Delaware corporations had higher firm value), with Guhan Subramanian,
The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004) (finding that "Delaware's
trajectory over the past twelve years is more consistent with the predictions of the race to the bottom
view.").
83
See supra notes 28, 49, 50, 51.
See Romano, supra note 13, at 1532-43.
84
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regulatory infrastructure which defines and channels corporate activity and85 has

moved our system of corporate governance toward a CEO primacy model.
Some commentators have suggested that federal standards should be
expanded or that federal incorporation should displace the operation of state
corporate governance standards for publicly held companies, to varying
degrees. 86 Federal intervention has thus far been episodic and sporadic rather
than comprehensively preemptive.87 The federal regulatory framework has

itself, however, recently been marked by special interest "raids" particularly
when the public gaze is diverted from issues of financial regulation-which is
to say, almost always. 88 The Securities and Exchange Commission, the primary
federal regulatory authority in the area of capital market regulation for
corporations issuing securities, has a spotty record at best of resisting special
interest influence.89

Thus, vesting comprehensive power over corporate

governance for publicly held companies in the SEC (as currently structured, at

least) is not likely to be successful. 90 Merely calling for federalization of
corporate governance misses this point. 91 Indeed, there is good reason to

believe that a federal special interest raid was a key precipitating cause of the
corporate scandals that erupted in 2001 and 2002.

Federal law leaves too

much space for the exercise of political influence.
85
See, e.g., BOGLE, supra note 3, at 28 (stating that a "pathological mutation" has gripped
corporate governance as "owners' capitalism" has become "managers' capitalism" and executive
compensation soared resulting in the transfer of trillions in wealth from shareholders to CEOs and other
insiders).
86
See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate
Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 629 (2004) ("1 do not advocate wholesale federal preemption or the
development of an optional federal scheme. Instead I urge a sustained vigilance from Congress and a
willingness to take limited preemptive measures when state law rules fall short in ... protection of
investors.").
87
See Ramirez, supra note 40, at 40-41.
88
See Ramirez, supra note 22, at 579 ("Inappropriate political and special interest influence
pervade financial regulation. The American economy has suffered as a result.").
89
Former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt has documented how special interest influence subverted
the ability of the SEC to protect the investing public and pursue reform in the 1990s. Levitt, supra note
28, at 10 ("Once I began pursuing my agenda... I saw a dynamic I hadn't fully witnessed before: the
ability of Wall Street and corporate America to combine their considerable forces to stymie reform
efforts."). Levitt asserts that these two "interest groups" thwarted the interests of disorganized and
underfunded investors across a range of issues, from expensing stock options to auditor independence.
Id. at 10-12, 136-37.
90
Id.
91
See Joel Seligman, The Case for Minimum FederalCorporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L.
REv. 947, 949 (1990) (discussing laxity as a result of state law changes in shareholder litigation,
restrictions in shareholder suffrage, and decline of tender offers, but failing to explain how federal law
would lead to a superior outcome).
92
See MILLS, supra note 2, at 45, 87 (blaming the onset of CEO primacy on, among other
things, the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995 (PSLRA)); Ho Young Lee & Vivek Mande, The
Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Accounting Discretion of Client
Managersof Big 6 and Non-Big 6 Auditors. 22 AuDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 93, 93 ("[W]e find that
after the PSLRA income-increasing discretionary accruals rise for auditees of Big 6 firms but not for
auditees of non-Big 6 firms."). The authors use Big 6 firms to illustrate the impact of the PSLRA
because their deep pockets make them more susceptible to litigation, and thus more sensitive to the
changes wrought by the PSLRA. Id.
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On some levels, the corporate corruption crisis of late 2001 and 2002
settled the debate regarding whether the system of corporate federalism9 3 in the
United States leads to excessive laxity in corporate governance standards or
results in competitive pressure for states to formulate ever more ideal
standards.9 4 The parade of corporate corruption seems inconsistent with the
idea that corporate federalism in the United States has resulted in an optimal
corporate governance regime. 95 In addition, to the extent that the current
regime is suboptimal and results in periodic financial crises, SOX proves yet
again the likelihood of creeping federalization. 96 Federal intervention is
therefore an increasing reality in corporate governance for publicly traded
companies; 97 indeed, future meltdowns in investor confidence are likely to lead
to ever more intrusive federal9 regulation, ultimately culminating in some
8
system of federal incorporation.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to review the empirical record to date with
respect to corporate federalism, to assess the possibility that markets can still be
99
used to continuously move corporate governance in a more ideal direction.
The major problem with any argument that markets will move states toward
more optimal corporate governance law is that no study has been able to find
any evidence that investors make decisions based upon the law of the state of
incorporation. 100 The evidence that Delaware corporations are valued more
highly by capital markets is inconclusive at best.l11 Instead, investors seem far

93
By corporate federalism, I mean the combined state and federal law which governs the
obligations of the managers of public corporations and the division of authority between state and
federal law. See Cary, supranote 29; Romano, supra note 32.
94
See Jones, supra note 86, at 663 (stating that the political response to the spate of corporate
corruption in 2001-2002 "reveals flaws in modem federalist arguments denouncing national-level
regulation" and that "[u]nreflective allegiance to the internal affairs doctrine and the economic theories
invoked in its defense" should not stop future federal intervention into the corporate governance arena).
Others contend that there is no race. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition
in CorporateLaw, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002). Delaware's monopoly position may stem from network
externalities, meaning that Delaware is chosen not based upon merit as reflected in the demand for

corporate charters, but Delaware's familiarity among other corporate constituents. See Michael
Klausner, Corporations,CorporateLaw, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 852 (1995)

(noting that "the possibility that network externalities are significant in the corporate charter market
implies that the products produced in that market may be suboptimal"). Delaware obtains 20% of its
revenue from franchise fees paid by corporations chartered there. EISENBERG, supra note 39, at 202.
Ramirez, supranote 40, at 61-62 ("So long as executives of bankrupt firms haul in millions
95
while leaving their shareholders penniless, reality suggests that we have allowed blinding adoration of
market efficiency to lead us into the corporate governance gutter.").
96
See supra note 77.
See Seligman, supra note 47, at 1185 (calling for a "broad reexamination" of federal
97
corporate governance law).
See Romano, supra note 13, at 1523-26 (discussing compelling political pressure for
98
federal intervention in the wake of the stock market plunge of 2002 and the crisis of corporate
corruption).
99
See supra note 32.
Ramirez, supra note 22, at 572 (concluding that "investors neither care about nor have the
100
ability to judge the state of incorporation and the impact that this has on either upon their rights or
profits," based upon a review of empirical studies).
101

See supra note 82.
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more concerned about actual corporate governance practices at firms (which
can be implemented pursuant to any state corporation code) than which state
provides that substantive law for corporate governance.10 2 There is no
empirical basis for the claim that state corporate governance law is reflected by
stock market price in a way that will create market pressure for more optimal
corporate governance. 103
The most recent empirical analyses of the operation of corporate
federalism do not show that there is any race to the top spurred by corporate
federalism. One recent study found that firms that choose Delaware charters are
fundamentally different, and that any Delaware effect-a putative increase in
firm market value for Delaware firms-disappears after controlling for factors
such as accounting biases and analyst forecasts.'1 04 In 2003, Professors Lucian
Bebchuk and Alma Cohen demonstrated that when firm decisions are
disaggregated across jurisdictions (rather than viewed only from the
perspective of Delaware versus all other jurisdictions), a major factor driving
incorporation decisions is the strength of a given state's anti-takeover
legislation.10 5 Because anti-takeover legislation entrenches management and
shields them from competitive pressures of the market for corporate control,106
it is impossible to square this finding with a race to the top. 107 Thus, any
empirical foundation for any supposed race to the top has essentially
crumbled. 108 This suggests that politics, not markets, is driving corporate
governance standards at the state level.
102
For example, Institutional Shareholder Services, a provider of corporate governance rating
data for large shareholders, rates quality corporate governance based upon 63 factors-none of which is
based upon which state provides substantive law for the internal affairs of the corporation. ISS.com,
Corporate Governance Quotient Domestic Rating Criteria, availableat http://www.issproxy.com/professional/analytics/uscgqcriteria.jsp (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
103
EISENBERG, supra note 22, at 204 (stating that it "difficult if not impossible" to
demonstrate the optimality of Delaware's corporate law based upon stock market valuations."); LARRY
E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V. LETSOU, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 563 (3d ed. 1996) (reviewing empirical
studies and finding a lack of evidence that markets impound state corporate law).
104
Feng Chen et al., Are Delaware Firms Oranges? Fundamental Attributes and the
Delaware Effect (2006) (unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=912942).
105
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms'DecisionsWhere to Incorporate,46 J.L. &
ECON. 383, 387 (2003) (noting that "anti-takeover protections are correlated with success in the
incorporation market; adding anti-takeover statutes significantly increases the ability of states to retain
their local firms and to attract out-of-state incorporations").
106
The "overwhelming majority" of event studies show that anti-takeover protections have
either no effect on shareholder value or harm shareholder value. In addition, there isempirical evidence
that such statutes operate to increase agency costs. Id. at 404-05 (citing, inter alia, GRANT A. GARTMAN,
STATE ANTITAKEOVER LAW (2000)).

107
See id. at 421 ("[l]n contrast to the beliefs of supporters of state competition, the evidence
does not indicate that the incorporation market has penalized even those ... states that passed statutes
universally regarded as detrimental to shareholders.").
108
See supra note 82. Even before the Subramanian study showing that there was no durable
"Delaware effect" resulting in superior market valuations for Delaware firms, Professor Bebchuk
contested the Daines study to the contrary. Bebehuk, supra note 31, at 1820 ("This Article has shown
that the body of empirical evidence on which supporters of state competition rely does not warrant their
claims of empirical support."). Bebchuk questioned both the robustness of the association between
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C.

The Emergence of CEO Primacy

Any uncertainty remaining from the empirical record must be viewed in
light of lawmaking that is consistent only with the race to the bottom thesis.
10 9
In
The so-called duty of care illustrates the race to the bottom quite well.
1985 the Delaware Supreme Court held a board liable for breach of the duty of
0
Shortly after the decision to hold the directors
care in Smith v. Van Gorkom. 11

liable for gross negligence was issued, the Delaware legislature enacted a
statute that allowed directors to obliterate the duty of care through a provision
in the corporation's charter.' 1' By 1988, forty states had enacted director
insulating statutes. 112 The managers of the vast majority of public companies
were subsequently able to use their control over the proxy machinery 3 to
eliminate their own duty of care. 114 Professor Marc Steinberg thus stated: "The

evisceration of the duty of care is a drastic step in the corporate governance

115
The
framework. Any further erosion makes a mockery of fiduciary duty."
state of Nevada has now taken the next mocking step: Nevada insulates all
directors and officers from all liability unless it is proven they acted

intentionally, fraudulently, or in knowing violation of law."16 It is difficult to

Delaware incorporation and firm value and asserted that proponents of state competition had confused
correlation and causation because of possible material differences between firms choosing Delaware
charters and those choosing non-Delaware charters. Id. Further, Bebchuk argued that the benefits of
Delaware incorporation could stem not from Delaware corporate law but from network effects or the
benefits associated with Delaware courts. Id. These points have been largely vindicated by subsequent
empirical analyses including those undertaken by Subramanian (showing very weak robustness) and
Feng Chen (showing that firms incorporating in Delaware are materially different from firms
incorporating elsewhere and that therefore comparing Delaware firms with non-Delaware firms is like
comparing apples and oranges). See supra notes 82 and 104. Finally, Professors Bebchuk and Cohen
were unable to find any Delaware effect at all in 1999. Bebchuk & Cohen, supranote 105, at 403.
109
See Marc I. Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42 Sw. L.J. 919, 927-28
(1988). The business judgment rule has long operated to protect business managers from improvident
business decisions. In Delaware, this meant that business managers must be found grossly negligent to
breach their duty of care. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 611 (Del. Ch. 1974) (finding that the
business judgment rule did not protect directors that had recklessly accepted a "wholly inadequate" price
for the sale of the company). In practice, such a standard means that the duty of care seldom triggers
manager liability. I have argued in the past that this approach may be optimal, at least when combined
with appropriate private rights under the federal securities laws. Ramirez, supra note 8, at 361 n. 156.
110
488 A.2d 858 (1985).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Section 102(b)(7) authorizes a provision in the
Ill
charter of a Delaware corporation that shields directors from monetary liability for breaches of the duty
of care. Although such a provision requires shareholder approval, "[m]eaningful shareholder consent in
this context is an illusion given management's control of the proxy machinery process, the strong
inclination of institutional investors to vote with management, and the typical individual stockholder's
ignorance of corporate charter provisions." Steinberg, supra note 109, at 927.
James J. Hanks, Jr., EvaluatingRecent State Legislation on Directorand Officer Liability
112
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUs. LAW. 1207, 1209-21 (1988).
See, e.g. Joo, supra note 50, at 752-60 (demonstrating barriers to the effective use of
113
shareholder franchise rights against the wishes of management).
Delaware alone accounts for fifty percent of all public corporations. See supra note 39.
114
Steinberg, supra note 109, at 929.
115
NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7) (2003). This insulation may be eliminated by the articles of
116
incorporation. Id. Between 1980 and 2005, Smith v. Van Gorkom stands as the only example of outside
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argue that the story of the duty of care in American
corporate law is consistent
1 17

with anything other than a race to the bottom.'
Nor is the death of the duty of care the sole outlet for the efforts of
management to limit their duties and obligations. 118 Dean Seligman highlights
the restriction of shareholder suffrage rights, the decline of tender offers as a
source of discipline, and the decline in the ability of shareholders to pursue
litigation.

119

Others focus upon the lax standards governing compensation

decisions as a problem. 120 Each of the foregoing reflects accelerating laxity in

directors being found liable and paying damages. Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1065 (2006) (studying actual out-of-pocket liability rather than nominal liability). Thus,
Nevada's insulation seems more symbolic than substantive. In Nevada, as elsewhere, the duty of care for
directors is dead letter law. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L.
REv. 477, 490 (2000) (stating that because a very high percentage of public corporations take advantage
of insulating statutes, the directors' duty of care is "essentially obsolete"). Prior to 1980, duty of care
liability for directors was hardly common, a point lamented by respected corporate law voices, but
Professor Bishop found numerous reported cases of liability attaching even though he did not search for
unreported settlements. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Directorsand Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099-101, 1103 (1968) ("In sum, I think
that the practice of protecting corporate executives against litigation and liability has now been carried
about as far as it ought to be carried and perhaps a little farther.").
117
One argument frequently trotted out in favor of laxity is that rigor will repel qualified
directors from serving. One problem with this position is that there is little empirical support for it. See
Steven F. Cahan & Brett. R. Wilkinson, Board Composition and Regulatory Change: Evidence From
the Enactment of the New Companies Law in New Zealand, 28 FiN. MGMT. 32 (1999) (finding that the
more rigorous demands of the New Companies Act in New Zealand did not lead to a reduction in
outside director representation). An additional problem with this approach is that it is radically
overbroad-the same argument supports the abolition of all duties and obligations, a position no
commentator really supports.
118
The Delaware legislature was responding to "the perceived crisis in the D&O liability
insurance industry" when it passed Section 102(b)(7), according to the synopsis of the bill. See Michael
Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 43 (1989). This is odd given that the market value of such insurance companies rose
significantly after the Smith v. Van Gorkom decision. Id. at 73-74. It appears insurance companies were
able to use the decision to enhance their premium revenues with little real additional risk. Id.
("Surprisingly, we found that the common stock of firms that write D&O liability insumace rose
significantly in the wake of Trans Union. This increase in equity values suggests that insurers were able
to increase their premiums beyond the actuarially fair level."). Id. at 74.
119
Seligman, supra note 91, at 949-71 ("The most distinctive aspect of the last decade in
corporate law was the celerity with which traditional constraints on corporate managers weakened."). Id.
at 949.
120
Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling
Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 100 (1992) ("With the massive compensation now being awarded, courts
have the perfect opportunity to find specific plans are unreasonable and unfair to shareholders, instead of
shielding excess compensation practices with the business judgment rule."); Mark J. Loewenstein,
Reflections on Executive Compensation and Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV.
201, 214, 220 (1996) (stating that while some law suggests courts will enforce outer limits regarding
compensation "in publicly-held corporations, in fact the courts just do not reach the merits of a claim of
excessive compensation" because .of difficult procedural hurdles). Id. at 214. According to some
commentators, Delaware courts have traditionally been deferential to management. Jones, supra note 86,
at 646-55. Indeed, Professor Jones suggest that Delaware law provided "officers and directors a virtually
impregnable shield from monetary liability for corporate misdeeds." Id. at 646.
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the duties of managers during the 1980s and221990s. 121 This laxity is certainly
consistent with the race to the bottom thesis.'
However, a similar dynamic was transpiring simultaneously at the federal
level, where the focus had traditionally been on disclosure duties to
shareholders. In late 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act 123 (PSLRA). 124 The PSLRA imposed a new, more stringent
pleading standard on plaintiffs seeking relief under the federal securities laws;
imposed a new sanctions provision applying a loser-pays rule to such plaintiffs;
created a safe harbor for forward-looking frauds; restricted the ability of
plaintiffs to seek class action relief under the federal securities laws; imposed a
stricter statutory causation standard for private securities litigants; and
restricted the availability of joint and several liability for such claimants.' 25 In
1998, Congress followed up with the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act (SLUSA), 12 which eliminated state class actions in securities disputes
involving public companies. The dual effect of the PSLRA and the SLUSA 1is
27
to dilute the penalties and enforcement available to deter securities fraud.
Thus, laxity is not limited to state law, nor the result solely of any state
competition for corporate franchise revenues.
Of course, diluting the enforcement mechanisms and remedies available
could be beneficial if they are too harsh. 128 Unnecessary or excessive
regulation could amount to a tax on innovation or a tax on companies seeking
access to the public capital markets.'29 However, there is no evidence that the
private enforcement of the federal securities laws was not needed either at the
time of the passage of the PSLRA and the SLUSA or today. First, there was
near unanimity that investor confidence required supporting regulation and that
private litigation was essential to enforcing the federal securities laws. 130
Second, the late 1980s and early 1990s were hardly emblematic of a high
degree of corporate integrity and honesty in our capital markets and have been

121
See, e.g.,supra notes 118-120.
See supra notes 29-3 1.
122
123
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
124
See Ramirez, supra note 49, at 1080.
Id. at 1072-80.
125
Pub. L. No. 105-353 (1998).
126
127
Ramirez, supra note 49, at 1083-84.
128
Ramirez, supra note 40, at 43-44 (describing risks facing an active entrepreneur including
the possibility of ruinous litigation pursued by passive investor). The issue of whether there is too much
liability risk facing entrepreneurs will also be assessed in light of empirical analyses discussed in Part I1
of this paper. In short, that Part will demonstrate that there appears to be too little investor protection and
not too much. This is, in turn, supported by theories of special interest influence discussed in Part Ill of
this paper which suggest that because CEOs are a small group with concentrated wealth at their disposal,
operating in an environment that has low salience to the public, one could predict the decisively promanagement outcomes yielded by our current system of corporate federalism.
129
Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers:
Raising the Cost of Capitalin America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945,976 (1993).
130
Ramirez, supra note 49, at 1082 n. 128.
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termed a "sordid time for financial markets in the United States."'1 3 1 Finally, lax

conduct quickly followed the diminution of private enforcement, and empirical
evidence demonstrates that auditors in particular responded to the
PSLRA/SLUSA in predictable fashion: They allowed the spoliation of audit
quality so that CEOs could increase current income and thus their own
compensation.132 As such, it appears that the PSLRA/SLUSA led directly to
the spate of accounting driven securities frauds that plagued our capital markets
in the 1990s. 133 For the first time ever, federal law operated to restrict 34
investor
rights under state law, turning the federal securities laws on their head. 1
The end of private securities litigation as a constraint on management is
not the only element of federal law favoring the prerogatives of the CEO. CEOs

of public companies have the unique privilege of picking their own nominal
supervisors-the

board of directors.' 35 Under the federal proxy rules

(applicable to all publicly traded corporations) only management (i.e., the
CEO) has the power to use corporate funds to solicit proxy votes for its slate of

director candidates. 136 As Professor Tom Joo has demonstrated, even if a
shareholder mounts a proxy challenge, there are rules that systematically load

the dice in favor of management.' 3 7 If a mere shareholder wishes to place a
person on the board, the shareholder must absorb printing costs, postage costs,
and legal costs of mounting a full-blown proxy solicitation, and these costs can

amount to millions of dollars.'

131
132
133

38

Thus, there is typically only one candidate for

Id.
at 1089.
Lee & Mande, supra note 92, at 294.
See Douglas Guerrero, The Root of CorporateEvil, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec. 2004, at 37

("It appears that ...

highly placed executives used their power ...

to achieve financial targets

fraudulently, boost the stock price, and further enrich themselves via compensation schemes that
rewarded those achievements."); see also The Conference Bd. Comm'n on Pub. Trust & Private
Enterprise, Findings and Recommendations 5-6 (2003), available at http://www.conferenceboard.org/pdf free/SR-03-04.pdf (finding that excessive compensation, resulting in part from lax
monitoring by boards, led to an "unprecedented" loss of investor confidence). Id. at 5.
134
Ramirez, supra note 49, at 1059 n.13. Historically, the federal securities laws had
operated only to expand investor rights because federal remedies were cumulative with any state law
rights of recovery. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (stating that
Congress enacted the federal securities laws in order "to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available
common-law protections"). After SLUSA, federal law now operates to destroy state law private rights of
action. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006)
(holding that SLUSA preempted class action relief for plaintiffs alleging fraudulent inducement to hold
securities, and thereby destroyed such claims).
135
See Steven A. Ramirez, Rethinking the Corporation (and Race) in America: Can Law
(and Professionalization)Fix "Minor" Problems of Internalization, Externalization and Governance?,
79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 977, 982 n.24 (2005) ("The CEO typically holds ultimate control over
management and decisive control over the selection of directors.").
136
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a(8)(i)(8) (2006).
137
Joo, supra note 50, at 735. Professor Joo identifies two impediments to shareholder voting
power: federal proxy rules that prohibit inclusion of shareholder proposals relating to board membership
within management's proxy, meaning dissident shareholders must bear the steep costs of their own
proxy challenge, and authorization of brokers to vote shares within client accounts-invariably voting
with management-unless they receive contrary instructions. Id. at 758-60.
138
Id. In addition, the management may spend corporate funds to resist shareholder
proposals. Designed by Committee, ECONOMIST, June 15, 2002, at 71 (recounting a proxy contest at
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board positions in public corporations, and that candidate is selected by
management.' 39 This means that the CEO may stack the board with cultural

and social clones in order to maximize compensation.140 Shareholder
democracy is a myth in the United States, and management interests have
worked to keep it a myth. 141
Predictably, all of these pro-management outcomes led to a crisis in
investor confidence, culminating in a parade of corporate corruption scandals in
2001-2002.142 Recent events illustrate just how weak American corporate

governance standards have become and just how ineffective SOX has been in
restoring investor confidence. 143 In the summer of 2006, it became clear that
thousands of public corporations were backdating options grants to past dates
when their stock was trading lower to maximize payoffs to their senior
executives. 144 While backdating may not be illegal if both appropriately
disclosed and granted in accordance with tax law, by the end of the summer
Hewlett-Packard in which the company spent $150 million to fend off a proxy challenge brought by the
son of a company founder, Walter Hewlett).
139
Id. ("The CEO puts up the candidates, no one runs against them and management counts
the votes.") (quoting shareholder activist Nell Minow of The Corporate Library). One commentator has
stated that "electoral challenges" to incumbent management "are rare" and that the incidence of
successful challenges is "negligible." Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise 103,
155 (Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 567,
2007),, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=829804. Walter Hewlett, for example, lost his challenge,
despite having the prodigious advantages of a board seat and being heir to a founder. Steve Lohr, Suit
Against Hewlett Deal is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at C 1.
140
Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity
Lags in America's Boardroomsand What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1599 (2004)
(concluding that CEOs play the game of "homosocial reproduction" when selecting directors and
thereby increase their compensation). Recently, management interests have trumped the SEC's efforts to
break the stranglehold that management has over the proxy machinery and, therefore, voting power
within the public corporation. Parker, supra note 36, at 10 (stating that ferocious opposition from
corporate CEOs had stifled proxy reform, leading to management power over the director selection
process and higher compensation).
141
Id. The reductions in investor rights and protections are not limited to legislative and
regulatory promiscuity toward management, as the Supreme Court too has turned hostile to private
claims under the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (restricting
the statute of limitations for federal securities fraud to one year from the date of the discovery of the
fraud and in no event more than three years from the date of the fraud); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975) ("[L]itigation under Rule lOb-5 presents a danger of
vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general."). Rule
IOb-5 is the broadest federal remedy for securities fraud. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006) (outlawing
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities).
142
See supra notes 2, 35, 92, 119, 132. Professor Steinberg raised the possibility that the
securities law had turned too far in favor of management in early 2002: "[T]he risk and irony of the
tripartite action taken by Congress, the courts, and the SEC [is that] [i]n
seeking to enhance capital
formation and alleviating the burdens placed on business by the threat of vexatious litigation, the scales
may be tipped disproportionately against investor protection" which may make raising capital more
difficult for business. Marc 1.Steinberg, Curtailing Investor Protection Under the Securities Laws:
Goodfor the Economy?, 55 SMU L. REV. 347, 354 (2002).
143
See MILLS, supra note 2, at 180 (calling SOX "a very incomplete reform" and
"insufficient" to restore investor confidence).
144
Stephanie Saul, Study Finds Backdating of Options Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2006, at Cl (reporting on an academic study finding that "[miore than 2,000 companies appear to have
used backdated stock options to sweeten their top executives' pay packages").
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Communications and Comverse Technology.145 Moreover, over 100 companies
disclosed that their options practices were under investigation. 146 Rigging

options grants to maximize payoff to executives by picking some low price
point in the past as a fantasy and fraudulent grant date is "stealing money from
the company and shareholders."

147

It appears that this occurred systematically

over a period of ten years throughout corporate America. 148 Such practices
seem more about the crass enrichment of executives than creating any incentive

for performance; indeed, one company backdated options grants to enrich a
dead executive.14 9 The mere fact that this kind of scam was occurring at
publicly traded companies at all suggests that corporate governance is not

operating to reduce CEO autonomy (and thus agency costs) to acceptable
levels. 150
Overall, considering the legal trajectory of corporate governance law for
publicly held companies, it is not surprising that investment experts like John
Bogle see a "pathological mutation" in our system of capitalism that exalts the
interests of the CEO over all others. 151CEO primacy is a direct outcome of the
system of corporate governance law that devolved in the 1980s and 1990s into
a dictatorship of management, by management, and for management. 152 At
both the state and federal level, corporate governance in the 1980s and 1990s
became a parade of managerial indulgences.' 53 It seems that at every turn,
legislators, judges, and regulators eliminated or diluted constraints on the

145
Phantom of the Options, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 24, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/24/opinion/edoption.php.
146
Id.
147
Carolyn Said, Possible Options Scams at Several Local Companies, S.F. CHRON., May 6,
2006 (quoting compensation expert Fred Whittlesey). "It is stealing, in effect. It is ripping off
shareholders in an unconscionable way." Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Matter of Timing: Five More
Companies Show QuestionableOptions Pattern, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006, at Al (quoting former SEC
Chair Arthur Levitt).
148
See Randall A. Herron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern
Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 294 (2007) ("[W]e find evidence
suggesting that backdating is the major source of the abnormal stock return patterns around executive
stock option grants."). "We... estimate that 29.2% of firms atsome point engaged in manipulation of
grants to top executives between 1996 and 2005." Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock
Option Grants to Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated? 24 (Nov. 1, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, availableat http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/Grants-I 1-01-2006.pdf).
149
Dead Executive Gets Stock Options, BBC NEWS, Sept. 22, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/l/hi/business/537 1494.stm.
150
On the contrary, former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt has termed options backdating to be "the
ultimate in greed." See Forelle & Bandler, supra note 147. If compensation is the litmus test of CEO
power, then the legal indulgences of the 1980s and 1990s have served to greatly empower the CEO of
the public company. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD
REv. ECON. POL'Y 283, 297 (2005) (finding that the proportion of S&P 500 "aggregate earnings" going
to top executive compensation approximately doubled as a percentage of profits from 1993 to 2003).
151
See supra note 3.
152
See supra notes 109-142 and accompanying text.
153
See supra notes 109-142 and accompanying text.
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power of management. 54 One must believe that the best means of controlling

agency costs is to grant the agent unfettered discretion in order to believe that
corporate federalism yields optimal outcomes.' 55 Traditionally, some level of
judicial deference to management was manifest in the business judgment rule;
recently, that concept has succumbed to a new, more promiscuous paradigm of
CEO power unencumbered by virtually any civil liability. 156 The fact that this
occurred at both the state and federal level suggests that the problem transcends
corporate federalism and any debate about the race to the tol versus the race to
the bottom. The problem is inappropriate political influence. 57
1I.

The Emerging Science of Corporate Governance

At the same time, there is an emerging science of corporate governance
that exists independently of any debate regarding special interest influence or
any race either way at the state level. 1 58 This body of evidence empirically tests
the outcomes of specific elements of corporate governance.
Empirical

154
See supranotes 109-142 and accompanying text.
155
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) ("It is generally
impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions
from the principal's viewpoint."). The problem of agency costs within the corporation has bedeviled
shareholders and scholars from the very inception of corporate power; in fact, agency costs are inherent
to the issuance of corporate equity. Id. at 312-13. Controlling agency costs is key to the economic basis
of the corporation. Jensen & Meckling, supra,at 357.
156
As recently as 1983, authorities stated that the business judgment rule protected
management only when they act with a "reasonable basis." HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER,
LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 242 (1983). Even after the enhanced SOX criminal provisions took effect,
there remain gaps in the degree to which criminal law can serve as an effective means of reducing
agency costs and assuring that corporations adhere to legal mandates. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in
Crime: Guiding Economic Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 427
(2003) (finding that criminal liability has been diluted, in a way not addressed by SOX, through
downward sentencing departures granted by judges). Criminal prosecutions also require public
resources; private civil actions can be pursued free of politics.
157
For a complete analysis of the underlying political dynamics of corporate governance, see
Ramirez, supra note 1. CEOs are a concentrated group that commands concentrated economic resources.
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 1-2, 11-12, 165-66 (Rev. Ed. 1971) (stating

that very large groups will not pursue organizations to influence public goods like law because rational
actors will instead assume that they can free ride on the efforts of others; smaller goups therefore will
exercise disproportionate political influence). This will be discussed in greater detail in Part 111,infra.
158
It is clear that corporate governance can influence the functioning of the corporation in
terms of financial performance and macroeconomic output. Nick Bradley, Corporate Governance
Scoring and the Link Between Corporate Governance and Performance Indicators: In Search of the
Holy Grail, 12 CORP. Gov. 8 (2004) (stating that "the good news" is that there are links between
corporate governance and performance, but it is difficult to isolate the precise mechanisms driving such
links). It is also clear that these links have only recently been integrated at all into corporate governance
law, and then only in a most general sense. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Roles of Dispersed
Ownership: The Role of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, Ill YALE L.J.
1, 64-65 (2001) (stating that the empirical record "does fairly suggest that securities markets cannot
grow or expand to their full potential under a purely voluntary legal regime" and that mandatory law is
needed to prevent market "crises").
159
See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN.
1147, 1166-69 (2002) (finding evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection
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studies test the impact of corporate governance on macroeconomic
performance across nations, or the impact of specific innovations on corporate
financial performance. 160 This emerging interdisciplinary science of corporate
governance means that there is an emerging vision of optimized corporate
governance. '61 This emerging science serves a dual purpose: Not only does it
provide aspirational guidance, it also serves as a test of the current system's
ability to deliver appropriate corporate governance standards. 162 Instead of
theorizing or speculating about sound corporate governance, corporate
63
governance is now studied in terms of actual outcomes across disciplines.

These empirical analyses therefore demonstrate the inferiority of the current
regime of corporate federalism by showing how that regime yields deeply
suboptimal outcomes.
For example, given the centrality of information to the functioning of
markets, one may be tempted to conclude that any disclosure of corporate

information is beneficial to the functioning of financial markets and the
corporation as an institution. 64 However, empirical studies suggest this
theoretical supposition is flawed. 165 One recent study found companies that

provided frequent earnings guidance spent less on research and development
than those companies that provided less guidance, and therefore that such
companies suffered stunted financial performance over the long term. 166 It
of minority shareholders and higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders, especially in
countries with weak investor protections); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON.
1113 (1998) (providing empirical evidence that common law systems have superior shareholder
protections than civil law systems, and that greater shareholder protections gives rise to more dispersed
share ownership structures and larger capital markets); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of
External Finance,52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) (arguing that countries with weak investor protections tend to
have stunted capital markets).
160
Compare Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88
AM. ECON. REv. 537 (1998) (relating economic growth to financial development), and Maurice
Obstfeld, Risk-Taking, Global Diversificationand Growth, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 1310 (1994) (finding
that the ability of investors to diversify through markets encourages growth), with Ash Demirgiiq-Kunt
& Vojislav Maksimovic, Law, Finance and Firm Growth, 53 J. FIN. 2107, 2134 (1998) (finding that
firms in countries with active stock markets were able to obtain greater funds to finance growth) and
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 559
(1998) (finding that industries dependent on external finance are more developed in countries with better
protection of external investors).
Analyses of optimal corporate governance standards appear in economics journals,
161
finance journals, law journals, and accounting journals. See supra notes 10, 34, 122, 132, 133.
162
Professor Romano relies upon an empirical analysis of corporate governance standards to
impugn the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but no scholar has thus far used this body of evidence to impugn our
current system of corporate federalism and to articulate a new regulatory framework that can incorporate
this learning into law in a systematic way. See Romano, supra note 13, at 1533-43.
163
See, e.g., Fields & Keys, supra note 33, at 12-13 (2003) (overview of empirical evidence
regarding governance structures associated with financial performance).
The Sound of Silence, ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2006, at 79 (noting that defenders of
164
corporate earnings guidance argue that disclosure of "more information is always better").
Mei Cheng, K.R. Subramanyam & Yuan Zhang, Earnings Guidance and Managerial
165
Myopia (Nov. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=851545). This study involved a sample of 989 companies across ten industries. Id. at 11.
166
Id. at 29 ("[W]e document that dedicated guiders invest less in R&D . . . and have
significantly lower [return on assets] growth than occasional guiders.").
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appears that the flawed system of American corporate governance gives CEOs
the opportunity to forgo long term financial performance in favor of short term
profitability (and presumably higher CEO pay).
Corporate governance should operate to limit CEO autonomy and to
protect investors; this will lead to superior outcomes, because if investors are
confident that their reasonable expectations will be secured by law they will
invest at a lower cost to entrepreneurs. 167 Thus, investor protection is
associated with higher economic growth. 168 One study found that companies
with superior corporate governance measures (based upon an assessment of
twenty-four different corporate governance elements that affect shareholder
rights) enjoyed superior stock market valuations.' 69 Weak investor protection
leads to a shift in the corporate balance of power in favor of management which
will increase self-dealing and lead to higher compensation for executives. 170 If
executive compensation is the "canary in the coal mine" signaling pervasively

167
When their rights are better protected by the law, outside investors are willing to pay more for
financial assets such as equity and debt. They pay more because they recognize that, with
better legal protection, more of the firm's profits will come back to them as interest or
dividends as opposed to being expropriated by the entrepreneur who controls the firm. By
limiting the expropriation, the law raises the price that securities fetch in the marketplace. In
turn, this enables more entrepreneurs to finance their investments externally, leading to the
expansion of financial markets.
Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002). Financial
market development is key to economic growth. See supranote 160.
168
Rui Castro, Gian Luca Clementi & Glenn MacDonald, Investor Protection, Optimal
Incentives, and Economic Growth, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1131, 1131-35, 1166-67 (2004) ("[W]e employ
standard techniques from the empirical growth literature to investigate the nature of the relation between
investor protection and growth. Consistent with earlier studies we find a positive association."). Id. at
1133.
169
Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 10809 (2003). The index used in this study consisted of twenty-four factors of corporate governance that the
authors broke down into five groups: (i) factors associated with delaying hostile threats to corporate
control; (ii) factors associated with voting rights; (iii) factors designed to protect officers and directors
from liability or termination; (iv) other anti-takeover protections; and (v) state laws bearing upon
takeovers. Id. at 110-14. One of the factors included in this study is the existence of charter amendments
to limit director liability for breach of the duty of care. Id. at 148-49. Prior studies also found that this
particular factor is destructive of shareholder value. Bradley & Schipani, supra note 118, at 43. Other
studies link various indices of shareholder rights to financial performance. See Lucian Bebchuk et al.,
What Matters in Corporate Governance?, Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and
Business, Discussion Paper No. 491, 2005, at 4, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=593423 (finding that staggered boards, supermajority voting
requirements, poison pills, golden parachute provisions, and limits on shareholder voting power, all of
which entrench management, accounted for most of the drag on financial performance attributable to
weak corporate governance); Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and
Company Performance 3 (December 7, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/Corporate%20Governance%2Study%201.04.pdf)
(finding
that
a
governance index based upon fifty-one elements influences operating performance, valuation, and cash
payouts to shareholders).
170 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Roell, CorporateGovernance and Control, in I A
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE I (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & Rent M.
Stulz eds., 2003) (stating that corporate governance must stem self-dealing by managers and that soaring
executive compensation in the United States is difficult to justify).
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weak corporate governance, then there is cause for serious concern in the
United States, where CEO compensation relative to earnings has doubled over
the past ten years. 171In the long run, securing the reasonable expectations of
investors through legal protection serves the economy in general, and
entrepreneurs in particular, while also operating to limit agency costs.
Investor protection entails mandatory disclosure of material information to
the investing public, such as that traditionally required under the federal
securities laws in the United States. 72 To the extent investors have access to
reliable investment information, they should theoretically be more willing to
invest, meaning entrepreneurs and businesses will enjoy a lower cost of
capital. 173 While one may expect private contracts to be the most effective way
to assure an efficient means of securing appropriate information flows, in fact
such contracting appears prohibitively costly.I14 Beyond that, management is
likely to be more focused on shareholder maximization if they are required to
disclose financial information periodically. 175 Empirical evidence now supports
these theoretical conclusions. Specifically, Professors Greenstone, Oyer, and
Vissing-Jorgensen found that when the applicability of the federal mandatory
disclosure regime was extended to firms traded in over-the-counter markets in
1964, those firms enjoyed excess returns and gains in operating performance
when they commenced compliance as well as in the period following the
relevant legislative proposals. 176 "Overall, the results suggest that the benefits

171
Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 150, at 297 (2005) (finding that the proportion of S&P
500 profits going to top executive compensation approximately doubled as a percentage of profits from
1993 to 2003). More than excess compensation may result from weak corporate governance. For
example, the Gompers study found that weak corporate governance was also associated with inferior
investment outcomes, as unconstrained CEOs engaged in acquisitions and investments that did not
maximize shareholder value. Gompers et al., supra note 169, at 132-37.
172
Michael Greenstone et al., Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities
Acts Amendments, 121 Q.J. ECON. 399, 447 (2006) (noting that "these results should cause policymakers to question the basis of recent calls to repeal U.S. federal mandatory disclosure requirements").
173
Id. at 399-400.
174
Id. at 405.
175
Id. at 406-07 (citing Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity
Markets, 66 J. FIN. EcON. 3, 5 (2002) (articulating a theoretical financial model that accounts for the
following empirical facts associated with better shareholder protection: that it yields larger firms that are
more valuable and plentiful, that it lowers the diversion of profits and raises dividends, and that it yields
a lower concentration of ownership and more developed financial markets)).
176
Id. at 446-47. Previous studies had reached divergent conclusions regarding the efficacy
of the federal mandatory disclosure regime. Compare George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the
Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117, 124 (1964) ("[Sltudies suggest that the SEC registration
requirements had no important effect on the quality of new securities sold to the public."), with Irwin
Friend & Edward S. Herman, The SEC Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382, 389 (1964) ("We doubt
that any person reasonably well acquainted with the evolution of stock-market practices between the
pre- and post-SEC periods could lament or underrate the success of the new legislation in eradicating
many of [the] weaknesses in our capital markets."). These studies suffered from an inability to isolate
the impact of the federal securities laws from exogenous events that impacted stock prices generally.
Greenstone et al. are able to avoid these problems by using the extension of the federal securities laws
pursuant to the 1964 Securities Act Amendments to compare the performance of affected firms against
firms listed on the major stock exchanges already covered by federal mandatory disclosure
requirements. Greenstone et al., supra note 172, at 401.
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of the 1964 Amendments substantially outweigh the costs of complying with
this law as measured by stock returns." 177
Given that investor protection is essential to securing the appropriate

economic and financial operation of the public corporation, it would be natural
to consider private enforcement and private rights of action as necessary
components of an investor protection regime. 178 In fact, empirical evidence
now demonstrates that "standards of liability facilitating investor recovery of
losses are associated with larger stock markets."' 179 This conclusion is
supported by a comparison of forty-nine nations in terms of financial
development and strength of investor remedies, compiled with the input of
attorneys from around the world.' 8 ° The authors compared liability standards
by focusing on the degree of culpability of the defendant-ranging from fraud
181
to strict liability-as a means of assessing strength of investor rights.
Importantly, this study regarding the appropriate role of private securities
enforcement tracks the outcome of a parallel study of private remedies for selfdealing under corporate law: "[T]he results [of this study] suggest that giving
aggrieved shareholders the standing to sue, access to information to identify
self-dealing, and a low burden of proof would deter self-dealing and promote
stock market development."' 182 As shown in Part II, however, these rights, and
therefore the entire mandatory disclosure regime, have been legally diluted
over the past few decades.
An additional issue that has been studied in depth is the effect of board

diversity upon corporate financial performance.'

83

"[H]uman resource theorists

have supported expectations for increased performance and increased value for
companies providing programs that integrate diversity initiatives since at least

177
Greenstone et al., supra note 172, at 403.
178
Ramirez, supra note 49, at 1082-83. Finance professors state the justification for broader
investor remedies as based upon efficiency considerations (which suggest the issuer is the lowest cost
provider of information) and the need to create adequate incentives for the disclosure of information.
Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 5 (2006).
179
La Porta et al., supra note 178, at 28. More specifically:
The results on liability standards are also consistently strong. The estimated coefficients
predict that a two-standard deviation increase in this variable (roughly the distance from
Denmark to the U.S.) is associated with an increase of 0.23 percentage points in the externalmarket-to-GDP ratio, a 28% rise in listed firms per capita, a 1.88 increase in the IPO-to-GDP
ratio, a 6.6 percentage point drop in the block premium, a 0.75 point improvement in the
access-to-equity index, a decrease of 6.6 percentage point drop in ownership concentration
(but with a t-stat of only 1.58), and a 45.8 points increase in the volume-to-GDP ratio.
Id. at 19.
180
Id.at 5.
181
Id.at 7.
182
Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (Apr. 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working..papers/SelfDeal April 13.pdf).
183
David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity and Firm Value, 38 FIN.
REV. 33, 36 (2003) ("[D]iversity produces more effective problem solving. While heterogeneity may
initially produce more conflict . . . the variety of perspectives that emerges cause decision makers to
evaluate more alternatives and more carefully explore the consequences of these alternatives.").
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the early 1990s. '' i84 In general, diversity at the board level is associated with

superior corporate governance and better financial performance.' 8 5 Diversity
has been shown to enhance cognitive functioning of groups and to disrupt
groupthink, a dynamic characterized by mindless adherence to group norms
and assumptions. 186 Left to their own discretion, it appears that CEOs
specifically engage in homosocial reproduction 187 to stock boards with those
friendly to the CEO's interests in general in order to enhance their
compensation. 188 This natural tendency is also demonstrated through CEO
exploitation of board interlocks (where networks of CEOs serve on each other's
boards) in a way that enhances their compensation. 189 Despite powerful
evidence suggesting that board diversity leads to superior outcomes in terms of
corporate performance and corporate governance, CEOs today reign supreme

under law in selecting board members.

184
Fields & Keys, supra note 33, at 12. See also Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the
Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85 (2000) (summarizing theoretical and empirical case that law
should encourage businesses to embrace diversity).
185
Carter, supra note 183, at 51 ("After controlling for size, industry and other corporate
governance measures, we find statistically significant positive relationships between the presence of
women or minorities on the board and firm value."); see also David A. Brown et a]., The Conference
Bd. of Can., Women on Board: Not Just the Right thing... But the "Bright" Thing, at i-ii
(2002),
available at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.asp?mext-374 (finding that gender diversity
enhanced corporate governance); Rene B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Gender Diversity in the
Boardroom, European Corporate Governance Institute, Finance Working Paper No. 57/2004, Nov.
2004, at 19, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=594506 ("Overall, our
results suggest quite strongly that in boards with relatively more women, more directors participate in
decision-making, which may enhance their effectiveness.").
186
See Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance:
UnderstandingBoards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489,
494-99 (1999) (stating that heterogeneous boards benefit from cognitive conflict that results in a more
thorough consideration of problems and solutions); see also Marlene A. O'Connor, The Enron Board:
The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1306 (2003) (stating that "social homogeneity on
corporate boards harms critical deliberation" and that "the best way to avoid groupthink is to prevent
enclaves of like-minded people from making group decisions," therefore, "reform proposals should
discourage groupthink by promoting more diversity on boards in terms of gender, race, class, ethnicity,
age, national origin, sexual orientation, and socio-economic background, as well as expertise and
temperament").
187
Rosabeth Kanter originally coined the term "homosocial reproduction" to explain why
white male managers seemed inclined toward homogeneity. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND
WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 48, 63 (1977). Thus, homosocial reproduction may be a significant
factor in disparate treatment of women and minorities throughout the corporate hierarchy.
188
James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern?: CEO/Board Power,
Demographic Similarity, and New DirectorSelection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60, 77 (1995) (finding that "in
firms in which CEOs are relatively powerful, new directors are likely to be demographically similar to
the firm's incumbent CEO"). Westphal and Zajac's study is based upon data from 413 Fortune/Forbes
500 companies from 1986 to 1991. Id. at 61. They define demographic diversity in terms of age,
educational background, tenure with the organization, and insider/outsider status. Id. at 63-65.
Nevertheless, the authors proceed from the assumption that "in-group bias" is "quite powerful" even
when based upon irrelevant factors. Id. at 62. Westphal and Zajac conclude that cultural homogeneity on
the board leads to higher compensation for the CEO. Id. at 79.
189
Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO Compensation and Turnover: The Effects of
Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 935, 947-51 (2003) ("[T]he number of mutual
director interlocks is found to be significant and positively associated with total compensation.").
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A further area of inquiry involves anti-takeover protections, which
typically operate at the state level to insulate current management from the

pressures of competitive corporate control markets. 190 Such protections make it
difficult to oust incumbent managers from control, which serves to enhance

their power and increase agency costs, in the form of higher executive
compensation.1 91 Another study found that anti-takeover legislation also
weakened management incentives to negotiate lower labor costs generally, as
CEOs apparently utilized their enhanced power to favor co-employees over
more distant and less visible shareholders. 192 Indeed, it appears that, in general,

such laws are associated with more lethargic management as the enhanced
entrenchment leads to diminished investment in plants and lower productivity
and profitability.' 93 These facts are consistent with a slew of studies that
demonstrate enhanced CEO power is closely associated with higher CEO pay,

although not enhanced performance.

194

In all, it appears that anti-takeover

Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 105, at 404 (stating that most states have anti-takeover
190
statutes and Delaware courts have permitted management to engage in anti-takeover tactics such as
poison pills which operate to dilute those attempting to seize control).
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Corporate Governance and Executive Pay:
191
Evidence from Takeover Legislation 22 (Nov. 29, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mullainathan/papers/execcomp.pdf) ("We have provided some
evidence that state anti-takeover laws on average raised the total compensation for CEOs. This finding is
consistent with the view that CEOs expropriate what they can from relatively powerless shareholders
"). One may have expected
and pay themselves more when takeover discipline goes down ....
compensation to go down in the wake of anti-takeover legislation, as CEOs would no longer demand
compensation for the risk of takeover. Id. at 2. This would have vindicated the idea that CEO pay is the
result of an optimal contract between principal and agent. Id. Instead, the finding of the study tends to
confirm a skimming model of CEO compensation. Id. at 22. Importantly, the authors found that the
presence of a large shareholder mitigated pay raises and was associated with greater incentive
compensation innovations in the wake of anti-takeover legislation, as larger shareholders apparently
acted more optimally as agents and searched for substitute forms of discipline. Id.
192
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test
Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. EcON. 535 (1999)
193
We found that antitakeover laws generated rises in blue-collar workers' wages and even larger
rises in white-collar workers' wages. This suggests that managers prefer to pay workers
(especially white-collar ones) higher wages, which is consistent with stakeholder theories of
the firm. However, we found that these higher wages did not, on net, translate into greater
operating efficiency, suggesting that stakeholder protection did not "pay for itself" We also
found evidence of a decline in the level of both plant creation and destruction, with little effect
on overall firm size.
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and
ManagerialPreferences, Ill J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1072 (2003).
See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewardedfor Luck? The
194
Ones Without PrincipalsAre, 116 Q.J. ECON. 901, 920-26 (2001) (finding more pay-for-luck at firms
without a large outside shareholder); Richard M. Cyert et al., Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and
Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence, 48 MGMT. ScI. 453 (2002) (finding that the
presence of large shareholders, boards with higher equity ownership, and higher firm default risk are
associated with lower compensation); Westphal & Zajac, supra note 188, at 77, 79 (finding that "in
firms in which CEOs are relatively powerful, new directors are likely to be demographically similar to
the firm's incumbent CEO" and compensation increases).
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protections serve
to enhance management power and compromise
95
performance. 1
Board composition has also commanded significant attention from
corporate governance scholars. 196 For example, a staggered board may be a
powerful anti-takeover device that operates to frustrate the ability of outsiders
to seize control of a corporation. 197 There is robust evidence that a board that is
independent of the CEO enhances corporate valuation.' 98 Moreover, boards
selected without input from the CEO are more independent and achieve a
higher market valuation.' 99 Yet, evidence of the efficacy of so-called outside
directors (those who are not otherwise employees of the corporation) is mixed
at best.20 0 On the other hand, there is powerful evidence that the separation of
CEO and Chairman of the Board into two positions reduces agency costs and
enhances firm value. 20 1 Similarly, there is evidence that an independent
nominating committee
for the selection of directors
is associated with superior
202
-performance.
It appears that board composition that reduces CEO autonomy

195
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1790
(2006) (showing that the market for corporate control is distorted by staggered boards as well as golden
parachute and other payments to incumbent management, and therefore "leaves management
considerable slack").
196
Fields & Keys, supra note 33, at 4-12.
197
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, Harvard John M.
Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 478, 2004, at 28, available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/03.Bebchuk-Cohen.Entrenched-Boards.pdf ("We find
that, even after controlling for firm value in 1990, having a staggered board in 1990 is associated with a
significantly lower value during the period 1995-2002. This finding is consistent with staggered boards
brining [sic] about a lower firm value and not merely being selected by low-value firms.").
198
Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board
Members: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829, 1852 (1999) (finding a higher stock market valuation
when the CEO is not involved in the director selection process than when the CEO is involved).
Significantly, Shivdasani and Yermack distinguish between outside directors who have close links to the
CEO versus more independent outsiders. Id. at 1831.
199
Varma found that, in the closed-end mutual fund context, when directors are selected
without management involvement funds trade at higher valuations relative to net asset value. Raj Varma,
An Empirical Examination of Sponsor Influence Over the Board of Directors,38 FIN. REV. 55, 75 (2003)
(finding that closed-end mutual fund sponsors capture boards and that the market values boards selected
without sponsor involvement).
200
Compare Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. LAW 231, 231 (2002) (finding no linkage
between the proportion of outside directors and various measures of performance), with Ronald C.
Anderson et al., Board Characteristics,Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of Debt, 37 J. ACCT.
& ECON. 315 (2004) (finding that firms with more outside directors enjoy a lower cost of debt).
201
Brown & Caylor, supra note 169, at 7-8 (summarizing literature and finding, consistent
with that literature, that "firms are more valuable when the CEO and board chair positions are separate")
(citing John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Compensation, and Firm
Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1999) (finding lower CEO compensation when CEO and board
chair are split) and David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation for Firms with A Small Board of
Directors,40 J. FIN. ECON. 185 (1996) (finding higher firm valuations when CEO and board chair are
split)).
202
Brown & Caylor, supra note 169, at 18, 45 tbl.5 (finding that an independent nominating
committee is a top three factor in terms of return on equity and net profits). As elsewhere, endogeniety
problems plague research in this area and it is difficult to discern if board composition drives
performance or performance drives board composition. Fields & Keys, supra note 33, at 5 (summarizing
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is associated with superior outcomes based upon the best corporate governance
science available; nonetheless, corporate governance law fails to do anything to

facilitate real board independence.
The emerging science of corporate governance also casts doubt on the

efficacy of the Sarbanes-Oxley reform initiatives. Professor Roberta Romano
has tested those reforms against the best empirical data regarding such
reforms. 20 3 Professor Romano found that the "compelling thrust" of the
empirical literature did not support the Section 301 requirement that public
companies have an audit committee composed entirely of outside directors as
defined by Congress. 20 4 She also finds "compelling" empirical support that

prohibiting auditors from providing non-audit services (as required by Section
of 201 of SOX) does not affect audit quality. 20 5 Apparently there is little
evidence supporting the efficacy of the requirement that CEOs and CFOs
certify the accuracy of financial statements, as mandated by Section 302 of
SOX. 20 6 In short, Professor Romano concludes that a "brief review of the
empirical literature suggests that a case does not exist for the principal
corporate governance mandates in SOX. ' 20 7 Moreover, the one SOX initiative
that is supported by empirical evidence, the appointment of a financial expert to
the audit committee, is not a mandate but a disclosure requirement. 20 8 Thus,
that the corporate governance initiatives were
Professor Romano concludes
"seriously misconceived. ' '20 9

literature); see also Gompers et al., supra note 169, at 144-45 (noting inability to eliminate possible
operation of some "unobservable firm characteristic").
203
The gist of the literature, that the proposed mandates would not be effective, was available to
legislators while they were formulating SOX. Yet, it went unnoticed or was ignored. With the
scholarly literature at odds with the proposed governance mandates being treated as though it
did not exist, the quality of the of decision making that went into the SOX legislative process
was, to put it mildly, less than optimal.
Romano, supra note 13, at 1526-27.
204
Id. at 1532 (citing 16 studies assessing efficacy of independent audit committees).
Id. at 1535-36 (citing 25 studies addressing the impact of permitting auditors to provide
205
non-audit services).
206
Id. at 1542 (citing two studies with inconsistent findings).
207
Id. at 1543.
208
Id. at 1532.
209
Id. at 1602. There is empirical evidence to the contrary. Brown and Caylor find that many
of the SOX reform initiatives are associated with superior financial performance. Brown & Caylor,
supra note 169, at 31 ("We find that independent board of directors, nominating committees and
compensation committees are associated with good firm performance."); see also Reena Aggarwal &
Robin Williamson, Did the New Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes?,
Feb. 12, 2006, at 1, 28 (unpublished manuscript) available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/Reemaaggarwal-GovemanceandFirmPerformance0206.pdf) (finding that SOX reforms enhanced firm values in a
"statistically and economically significant" way but simultaneity issues may mean that "more valuable
firms opt for better governance"). It is notable that the authors declined to opine on the necessity of the
SOX reforms because it appeared that the market rewarded sound voluntary corporate governance
during the pre-SOX period of 2002-2003 before the reforms were mandatory. Id. at 28.
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Professor Romano is correct in her diagnosis but not in her
prescription.2 10 She argues (again) in favor of the current system of corporate
federalism with a limited role for Congress. 211 The problem with this approach
is that there is little evidence that states are at all attentive to the very body of

empirical data that Professor Romano relies upon to impugn SOX. 2 12 It is
difficult, for example, to find any empirical data supporting the destruction of
the duty of care, yet the Delaware legislature has led the nation in doing exactly
that. 213 Similarly, when the Delaware courts permitted management to obtain

shareholder approval for incentive compensation programs without disclosing
management's valuation of such programs, there was no mention of any
empirical data. 214 Nor has Delaware or any other state since exhibited any
sensitivity to empirical outcomes. 2 15 Certainly, it is the case that some of the

210
My agreement with Professor Romano's diagnosis is limited by the recognition that
corporate federalism had degenerated to such an extent that something had to be done by the summer of
2002. I agree that Congress could have crafted better legislation, and that it would have been welladvised to heed the science of corporate governance. Unfortunately, corporate federalism had yielded
such power to CEOs during the 1980s and 1990s that the market reacted favorably to SOX, even though
it may have been a sub-optimal solution to the problem of management run amok. See supra notes 201202. Thus, my agreement with Professor Romano's diagnosis is strictly focused on the need for greater
harmony between corporate governance standards and the best learning available.
211
See supra note 32.
212
For example, in the recent Disney litigation, the Delaware courts had a clear opportunity
to vindicate extant empirical evidence showing the importance of investor protections and the need to
curb CEO power, but chose instead to be oblivious to this evidence and to allow management to conduct
itself without any risk of civil liability for any degree of negligence. See Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt
Disney Corp. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d. 27 (Del. 2006).
213
On the contrary, Gompers et al. specified duty of care insulation as one indicium of weak
corporate governance that they found associated with inferior performance. See Gompers et al., supra
note 169, at 144-45, 148-49. Moreover, Bradley and Schipani found that Delaware firms generally lost
value when the Delaware legislature provided for enhanced insulation with respect to the duty of care,
and that firms that took advantage of such insulation declined further in value. See Bradley & Schipani,
supra note 118, at 73-74. It would be inconsistent with any logic that the destruction of causes of action
held by shareholders would be costless. Thus, it seems the destruction of the duty of care can only be
deemed economically suboptimal. See THE CONFERENCE BD. COMM'N ON PUB. TRUST & PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE, supra note 133, at 5-6 (finding that excessive compensation, resulting in part from lax
monitoring by boards, led to an "unprecedented" loss of investor confidence during the corporate
corruption crisis of 2001-2002). Id. at 5.
214
See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 333 (Del. Ch. 1997) (holding that "allegations of
failure to disclose estimated present value calculations [of stock option grants] fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted" when management seeks shareholder approval of compensation and citing
no empirical evidence that this is an economically appropriate outcome). It is difficult to see how
shareholders can control agency costs if they are deprived of the information that management has
regarding the value of options grants. See Jensen & Meckling, supranote 155, at 357.
215
Most recently, the Delaware courts gave meaning to section 102(b)(7) by holding that to
be liable under that provision a plaintiff must show an absence of good faith, meaning:
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts
with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the
fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
disregard for his duties.
Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d. at 67 (quoting Post-trial Op. at *36, (footnotes omitted)). Again the court
was oblivious to any empirical learning regarding optimal corporate governance. See id. Professor Jones
argues that Delaware courts imposed "stricter judicial scrutiny" over management, in an possible effort
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state law outcomes discussed above predate the empirical data suggesting they
are economically and financially suboptimal outcomes. Nevertheless, there is
no apparent movement by any authority to revise these outcomes. 2 16 Thus, state
legislatures and courts are guilty of the same obliviousness to empirical
evidence as Congress.
In addition, there is likely a dearth of institutional capabilities within any
of these law making organs to integrate financial, economic, and accounting
studies into their deliberative process. 217 Legislators and judges are not
required to have advanced degrees in these areas, 218 nor should they be. They
have jurisdiction over a wide variety of legal issues and have neither the time
nor the expertise for such specialized knowledge. 2 19 It is hard to imagine a
productive debate in the halls of Congress or the courthouses of America
regarding the appropriate weight to give to the emerging science of corporate
governance in making corporate governance law. 22 Even an institution with
the resources of the Supreme Court of the United States seems unlikely to rest
its opinions on the state of empirical data. 221 Institutionally, neither legislators
nor judges are well-suited to interpreting and integrating the best learning on
corporate governance into law.
The lack of institutional capability and expertise certainly transcends the
corporate federalism debates about whether there is a race to the top or the
to preserve Delaware's position as the primary source of charters for public companies. Jones, supra
note 86, at 645. She wrote before the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in the Disney case. Apparently, the
Delaware judiciary reverted to its previous pro-management deference. Id. at 646. Professor Jones
musters convincing evidence that this shift was intended to protect Delaware's corporate law franchise.
Id. at 643-60.
216
See, e.g., supra notes 68-69.
217
The sheer volume of research in the science of corporate governance is tremendous. In
fact, "it is impossible to adequately cover even a small percentage of the literature." Fields & Keys,
supra note 33, at 19.
218
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, Ill (stating qualifications for federal legislature and federal
courts and not requiring an advanced degree in finance, accounting, or economics).
219
See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 13743 (1955) (articulating bases for agency regulation and including (i) the need to professionalize and
provide expertise for regulation; (ii) regulatory continuity; (iii) allow for rapid adaptation to changing
conditions; and (iv) reduce special interest influence); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE 10-29, 39-61 (1993) (arguing that regulation is dominated by random agendas and institutional
conflicts that create inconsistencies and uncoordinated regulation and proposing the creation of a class
of super-regulators with specific expertise and experience).
220
With respect to the PSLRA, for example, scholars had shown that there was no litigation
explosion, there was no evidence of impaired capital formation, and there was no showing of
extortionate settlements. Yet, these were the policy bases for the precipitous deregulation of the
securities markets that occurred with the substantial destruction of private enforcement. Ramirez, supra
note 49, at 1086-87.
221
For example, in the two most recent Supreme Court cases to diminish investor rights,
Dabitand Dura, the Court ignored all empirical data regarding the importance of investor protections to
corporate performance and economic growth, and instead continued its relentless march to CEO
primacy. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 1510 (2006) (ignoring
empirical record regarding economic importance of investor protection in favor of empirically unsound
rhetoric from the 1970s about the supposed "vexatiousness" of litigation under 10(b)(5)); Dura Pharm.,
Inc., v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2004) (finding that plaintiff's claim legally insufficient without
appearing to consider empirical data on importance of investor protections).
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bottom. Neither federal nor state authorities have exhibited any sensitivity to
222
Indeed, the lack of empirical
the emerging science of corporate governance.
support for SOX is only the beginning of legal dysfunction. 223 Many corporate
governance initiatives have not made it into law despite enjoying empirical
support. 224 There is an intolerable chasm between the teachings of corporate

governance science and corporate governance law. 225 In fact, one empirical
study assessing the impact of shareholder rights and investor protection on the
cost of capital found that the magnitude of departure from an optimal capital
structure is quite large even in advanced countries because of sub-optimal
corporate governance. 226 The study is founded on two premises which the

authors empirically confirmed: First, weaker investor protection leads to more
inside ownership, and second, more inside ownership leads to a higher cost of
capital. 227 The finding of too much inside ownership (and therefore an
unnecessarily high cost of capital) stems from the fact that weak investor

protection leaves entrepreneurs holding too much firm specific risk that they
cannot diversify.228 Thus, the gap between optimal corporate governance and
corporate governance law has been empirically demonstrated.

Beyond that, however, deficiencies are manifest across corporate
governance issues. The current system of corporate governance law looks
nothing like emerging corporate governance science. 229 There is no restriction

222
See supra notes 213-216 and accompanying text.
See id.
223
224
For example, consider the issue of board diversity. See Ramirez, supra note 140.
225
See Charles P. Himmelberg, et al., Investment, Protection, Ownership and the Cost of
Capital,at 38-39 (National Bank of Belgium, Working Papers - Research Series No. 25, May 2002),
available at http://www.nbb.be/doc/oc/repec/reswpp/WP25.pdf (noting that "there is still substantial
room for improvement in the design of the legal and regulatory environment for financial contracting
and corporate governance" even in developed countries like the United States). Id. at 39.
Id. at 38 (stating that the magnitude of the gap between ideal corporate governance and
226
actual corporate governance law, as evinced by the persistence of sub-optimal corporate capital
structures in terms of inside ownership, is "potentially quite large"); see also Gompers et al., supra note
169, at 145 (finding that potential gains from improvements in corporate governance "would be
enormous").
227
Himmelberg et al., supra note 225, at 38.
228
If the exogenous level of investor protection were perfect, insiders would optimally choose to
sell 100% of the equity (to diversify fully idiosyncratic risk) and steal nothing, but with
imperfect investor protection, this contract cannot be (costlessly) enforced. By retaining a
higher fraction of equity, insiders can credibly commit to lower rates of stealing, but are
forced to bear higher levels of diversifiable risk.
Id. at 2.
229
In an assessment of fifty-one corporate governance elements, firm valuation was
positively correlated with sound corporate governance, even after SOX, although not as strongly as prior
to SOX. This is further empirical evidence that, at least with respect to that particular index, there is still
room for improvement in U.S. corporate governance. Aggarwal & Williamson, supra note 209, at 28. It
is not my intent to construct a new index of investor protection, but rather simply to highlight glaring
deficiencies in the trajectory of corporate governance law versus the best corporate science offered by
economists and financial experts. Thus, the factors I focus upon are driven by a subjective sense of
specific elements that are most at odds with empirical learning rather than on elements that seem most
powerfully associated with firm value, firm financial performance, and macroeconomic performance.
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on management's earnings guidance. 23 There is no standard for encouraging
more diverse boards to disrupt homosocial reproduction. 23 1 Anti-takeover
protections serve to entrench management across the nation. 232 Congress and
the Supreme Court have gutted private securities claims, even though investor
protection is crucial to sound corporate governance. 233 Courts and legislatures
All of
have aggressively reduced private remedies over the last twenty years.
this is precisely in accordance with the predictions of public choice and other
theories of legislation and lawmaking. 235 Moreover, there are quite often
footprints of management interests surrounding diluted shareholder protections
23
and compromised investor rights. 36 The science of corporate governance
shows that there is no market pressure for optimized corporate governancethere is only market pressure for indulgent pro-management corporate
governance law. The next Part seeks to articulate a means by which market
action can be harnessed to achieve more optimal corporate governance
standards.
III.

Toward a Federal Reserve of Corporate Governance

American corporate governance is so indulgent of managers and so suboptimal because of the dual problems of corporate federalism and special
interest influence. 237 Managers freed themselves from the burden of private
securities litigation through the use of special interest influence. 238 The same
special interest influence subverted proxy reform. 23 9 With respect to the pattern
of indulgences at the state level, it is more difficult to isolate special interest
influence, but the fact that every change seems to operate to entrench the power
of management and enhance the sway of the CEO over the corporation suggests
that corporate federalism is ideally suited to the exercise of special interest
influence, not any largely mythological race to the top.24° As previously
argued, it would make little sense for managers to use their economic and

164-166 and accompanying text.
183-189 and accompanying text.
190-195 and accompanying text.
167-171, 178-182 and accompanying text.
109-142 and accompanying text.

230
231
232
233
234

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

235

See infra Part I11.

See supra notes 28, 36, 49, 50, 71, 80, 118. Professor Cary noted that in 1963 Delaware
236
declared it the policy of the state to enact pro-management corporation laws. Cary, supra note 29, at
669. Other commentators have noted the control that the corporate bar exercises over corporate law in
Delaware. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
CorporateLaw, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469,506-09 (1987).
237
Supra Parts i, 1I.
238
See supra notes 49, 80.
239
See supra notes 36, 50.
See Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic
240
of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1233 (2006) (stating that special interest negotiation taking
place between lawmakers and organized groups with wealth can be "well-hidden").
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political power at the federal level but not at the state level. 24' Outcomes at
both the federal and state level are simply not consistent with any explanation
other than special interest influence.
The exercise of special interest influence in this context would not
surprise the economists, political scientists, and legal scholars who have studied
the impact of economic and political power upon legal and regulatory
outcomes. 242 Mancur Olson's focus on the problem of collective action would
predict a highly pro-CEO outcome in corporate governance standards, given
the small number of CEOs, the wealth they command, their stakes in the
outcomes of corporate governance, and the barriers to organization that
shareholders face.243 Economists predict that growing inequality would
244
naturally lead to legal system outcomes that favor the rich and powerful.
Public choice enthusiasts would argue that law and regulation will always 245
be
shaped by the economic and political power of those subject to regulation.
241
There is evidence of special interest indulgences and inappropriate political influence
subverting corporate governance at all levels and institutional branches with lawmaking authority in the
area of corporate governance, resulting in compromised investor confidence and unjustified compliance
costs. See supra notes 12-15, 21, 36, 50, 51, 52, 44-77, 89, 109, 118, 133, 215, 225, 236.
242
Even the Supreme Court is the mere extension of politics by other means; for example,
Professor Derrick Bell long ago argued that the Court's remarkable eradication of American apartheid,
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), responded to powerful economic and political
pressure to develop the south and to sway people of color around the world against Communism. See
Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518, 523 (1980) (showing that Brown was the "subordination of law to interest-group politics").
Bell's thesis has since been buttressed by the research of Professor Dudziak. See Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 66, 82-84 (1988) (summarizing
materials from the Department of State and the Department of Justice supporting Bell's thesis). The
additional political insulation that the judiciary enjoys under the Constitution can not only be pierced by
major issues of the day, but can be affirmatively threatened by the political branches, as President
Franklin Roosevelt did in the 1930s. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's "Court-Packing"Plan, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 347.
243
See McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 240, at 1161 ("In the now standard. view of
politics.., small groups with high stakes arise independently, motivated by common interests and are
able to solve the 'free rider' problem of collective action on account of their small size.") (citing
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GOODS

(1965)). McCaffery and Cohen suggest that the triumph of special interest influence is a two way street:
Well-organized groups and legislators bargain to exchange legislative largess for campaign
contributions and other benefits for legislators. Id. at 1233-35 (finding that Congress exploits special
interests by stringing issues along and having repeated votes without resolving anything on issues such
the repeal of the estate tax).
244
Edward Glaeser et al., The Injustice ofInequality, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 199 (2003).
One recent study found that in the United States over the last twenty-five years the income share of the
top 10% increased substantially, garnering between 40-45% of earnings. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel
Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historicaland InternationalPerspective, 96 AM. ECON. REV.
PAPERS & PROC. 200, 201 (2006), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-saez/piketty-saezAEAPP06.pdf.
The increase is attributed to "the very large increases in top wages (especially top executive
compensation)." Id. at 204.
245
See Ronald A. Cass, The Meaning of Liberty: Notes on Problems Within the Fraternity,I
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 777, 790 (1984-85) ("Take almost any government program at
random, and a 'special interest' counter-majoritarian explanation can be found that is more plausible
than the public interest justification for it."). While a compelling argument can be made that regulation
may be subverted by special interests, important areas of regulation can be protected from special
interest influence, as exemplified by the Fed's administration of monetary policy. Ramirez, supra note
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Given this rich theoretical framework in favor of the centrality of special
interest influence, it is somewhat astonishing that corporate governance
scholars have not focused more on how special interest influence has set

corporate governance on such an indulgent pro-CEO course. 246 The sheer
weight of debate on corporate federalism seems to dominate the rethinking of
how corporate governance is made in the United States. 247 Nevertheless, the

highly pro-CEO outcomes yielded by corporate governance (most notably
regarding compensation), the relatively small number of CEOs, the wealth they
command, the high stakes they have in corporate governance, the transitory

nature of public scrutiny, and the highly political context in which corporate
governance law is made (legislatures and politicized agencies), seem to fit
theories of special interest power better than any race to the top thesis. 248 CEOs
are simply better organized and have superior economic and political resources
than the investing public.
Special interest influence does not invariably subvert regulation, even in
an area that is typically characterized as less than fascinating to the public.249 I
have previously demonstrated that the legal structure, the economic and
political context, and the nature of the regulatory franchise each influence the
ability of a regulatory agency to deliver upon its premise of specialized and
expert regulation in the general public interest.2 50 This reality of depoliticized
financial regulation is exemplified in the structure of the Federal Reserve
Board. 251 The Fed has been a remarkable regulatory success story in that it
seems far more responsive to economic science and market realities than to any

22, at 553. 1 have previously argued that when the public is focused upon an issue, it is possible that
special interests can be thwarted, particularly when the public is unified. Id. at 506 (stating that when the
public is focused on an issue or area of regulation, special interests cannot dominate regulation) (citing
Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 181 (1996)).
246
Professors Cary, Miller, and Macey are exceptions. See supra notes 71 and 236. Professor
Roe considers public choice theory and interest group politics in exploring the federal versus state
regulatory dynamics, but not insofar as the decidedly pro-management outcomes are concerned on both
levels. Roe, supra note 39, at 2541-43. Notably, he does not focus upon "statute after statute or exact
judicial holdings" but instead on "broad boundaries of corporate lawmaking." Id. at 2542.
247
See supra notes 29-32, 79-108.
248
Even the sporadic interference of Congress into state corporate governance law would be
forecast by theories of legal reform, particularly given the ability of corporate governance to influence
macroeconomic growth and stability. See Dani Rodrik, UnderstandingEconomic Policy Reform, 34 J.
ECON. LIT. 9, 31-38 (1996) (articulating a theory of economic reform which views economic crises as a
central factor); see also supra notes 41-77.
249
Ramirez, supra note 22, at 553 ("The historical and empirical record suggests that the Fed
has not exercised its power over monetary policy for the benefit of special interests.").
250
[T]he degree of political independence of an agency can be determined by considering: (1) the
breadth of its delegation; (2) the extent to which its governing body can be removed by the
President; (3) the terms of the members of its governing body, especially its Chair; (4) the
method of funding the agency; and (5) the degree to which the agency enjoys bipartisan, longterm political commitment to its independence.
Id. at 518.
251
Id. at 522-32.
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kind of political or special interest pressure. 252 Monetary policy mirrors

corporate governance in that it is highly specialized, it is a topic that rarely
engages public scrutiny, and it has tremendous economic importance.2 53 This
Part of this Article seeks to light the way for the creation of a regulatory entity
that can achieve similar success in the area of corporate governance.
The first element of such an agency is its legal structure. The Fed Board
254
of Governors enjoys extended terms and can only be removed for cause.
Their terms are staggered
a1 255 so no single president may exert too much influence
over monetary policy.
Each Board member is subject to post-employment
job restrictions. 256 Fed Governors enjoy competitive salaries. 257 The Fed is
self-funded and obtains its operating revenue through statutorily authorized
assessments on member banks. 258 Thus, the Fed is not beholden to the
congressional appropriations process. 259 This structure was created so that the
Fed could exercise its prodigious power over monetary policy in accordance
"with the general public interest" and not "the majority of special interests. 260
An agency charged with the creation of a federal incorporation regime should

252

Id. at 552 (demonstrating that the Fed has imbued monetary policy with a high degree of

expertise and that its staff is "splendid proof of an American meritocracy") (quoting WILLIAM GREIDER,
SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY 71 (1987)).

253
[D]epoliticization is an appropriate means of improving regulation, and not an attack on our
republican tradition, when: (1) the voting public has insufficient time, interest and resources to
make informed electoral decisions; (2) powerful interests exist that may benefit
disproportionally from regulatory policy; (3) the costs of misregulation are diffused and
deferred; (4) the regulatory environment evolves quicker than Congress can legislate; (5)
competing power blocks may persistently "freeze" Congress; and (6) the regulated area is so
complex that a high degree of expertise is necessary for effective regulation.
Id. at 554.
254
Id. at 522-24 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 241-42).
255
12 U.S.C. § 242 (2006).
256
Id.
257
5 U.S.C. §§ 5313-14 (2006).
258
12 U.S.C. §§ 243-44 (2006). In 2000, 1 proposed the creation of a depoliticized SEC.
Ramirez, supra note 22, at 574. 1 have now essentially abandoned that idea in favor of the more
aggressive proposal of a depoliticized federal chartering authority, for three reasons. First, although I
was pessimistic in 2000 regarding the ability of corporate federalism to appropriately operate to
optimize corporate governance, I underestimated how seriously flawed corporate governance had
become until the parade of corporate corruption scandals in 2001-2002. Id. at 561, 584 (stating that
financial regulation as then structured faced "grave difficulties" acting in the public interest, but that
crises in investor confidence may only occur "once a century"). Second, I underestimated the degree of
special interest influence over the SEC until its senior officers blew the whistle on the operation of such
influence. See supra notes 5, 29, and 41. Third, in 2000 the science of corporate governance was more
primitive than its current infancy; there is little reason to think that the SEC has the multidisciplinary
expertise necessary to translate corporate governance science into corporate governance standards. See
supra note 10. Thus, I propose a new agency without the history and fundamentally different focus than
the SEC, which has long been fixated upon disclosure.
259
Ramirez, supra note 22, at 522-24. The Fed is, however, periodically reviewed by
government auditing agencies, and presumably if abuses were uncovered, Congress could reign in the
current funding latitude that the Fed enjoys. Id. at 525 n. 110. No agency of the United States should
have unbridled discretion over its funds and expenditures.
260
H.R. REP. NO. 74-742, at 1, 6 (1935).
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be structured along these lines, and should be free from the politics implicit in
the congressional appropriations process by having the power to assess public

companies for its operating costs.
The legal structure of a depoliticized agency, however, must be supported

by a political and economic context that favors non-interference from the more
political branches. The Fed, for example, is fully cognizant of the limitations on
its powers posed by the fact that the political branches could abolish it. 26I This
is a real source of restraint. 262 On the other hand, if the political branches were
ever to precipitously impinge upon the Fed's independence, financial markets
would react negatively. 263 Corporate governance standards like monetary
policy are debated moment to moment as investors and markets react to the
actual financial performance of companies. 264 Thus, like monetary policy,
265
corporate governance would be subject to market tests and limitations.
Depoliticized monetary policy has stood the test of time: Financial markets
essentially demand it, and politicians acquiesce to it. 266 There must be the
development of a similar political and economic coalition in favor of corporate
governance based upon economic science instead of power. 267 The context of a
depoliticized agency is most assuredly supported by elements of market
discipline. 268 Thus, I also propose a market check on the power of any agency
created to formulate corporate governance for public corporations.
261
262

THIBAUT DE SAINT PHALLE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE 77 (1985).
JOHN T. WOOLLEY, MONETARY POLITICS: THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE POLITICS OF

MONETARY POLICY 125-30 (1984) (studying monetary policy and concluding that the Fed "lies low"
during election years for fear of being accused of playing political favorites).
263
Id. at 118 (reporting on Reagan Administration effort to threaten the Fed and the adverse
financial reaction this generated); see also Vartanig G. Vartan, Independent Fed Is Supported, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 1982, at D7 (noting the resistance of the financial community to the threat to Fed
independence).
264
See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 40, at 31-36; see also supra note 100.
265
The Fed only has direct control over short-term interest rates, and is at the mercy of the
market's inflationary expectations insofar as long-term rates are concerned. E. Gerald Corrigan, Are
Banks Special?, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ANNUAL REPORT 1981, at 11 (1982).

266
Ramirez, supra note 22, at 528-30.
267
There are many powerful capitalists that would favor an institutional framework that
resulted in superior corporate governance. Indeed, John D. Rockefeller and representatives of J.P.
Morgan were early proponents of federalizing corporate governance in order to stem a race to the
bottom. GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN
HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 63-64 (1963). Moreover, institutional investors are increasingly recognizing
that corporate governance in America has failed. Institutional investors now hold 55% of all equity in
the United States. Thus far social, cultural, and regulatory realities have impeded this potential force for
shareholder rights from fully manifesting itself. See EISENBERG, supra note 39, at 154-62.
268
Centralization of regulatory authority is another key element of contextual support for a
depoliticized agency. Centralization of regulatory authority means that an agency has autonomy over a
zone of issues without attending to the potentially conflicting charter of other regulatory authorities. If
an agency has centralized authority then it will not have overlapping authority with another regulator
that may have conflicting goals. Similarly, concurrent agency authority may also lead to inconsistent
approaches and rules relating to the same or related issues. See Larry D. Wall & Robert A. Eisenbeis,
FinancialRegulatory Structureand the Resolution of Conflicting Goals, 16 J. FIN. SERVICES RESEARCH
223, 241 (1999) ("In most cases, Congress may be best served by... assigning the problems to a single
agency, setting clear priorities for the agency and holding the agency accountable for its actions."). I am
essentially arguing for the creation of a new agency that would have comprehensive authority over all
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Investors should have the specific right to elect corporate governance
regimes-specifically, by electing to incorporate under the authority of federal
law. 2 6 9 Vesting the right to select corporate governance regimes in shareholders
puts real substance into shareholder primacy rhetoric. 2 70 As such it would
vindicate the corporation's essential purpose: to facilitate the application of
capital from passive investors to productive investment in profitable
enterprises. 27 Shareholders should have some defined means of selecting the
The power of the
optional federal regime or exiting the federal regime.
depoliticized agency would also be limited by the market's assessment of
optimal corporate governance; to the extent inappropriate standards are
promulgated, charters (and accompanying franchise revenues) will migrate
away from the federally-sponsored regime. 273 Vesting shareholders with the

aspects of corporate governance for companies choosing to submit to the new agency. The states and the
SEC would lose all direct authority over such companies insofar as corporate governance is concerned.
269
Bebchuk, supra note 26, at 836 ("Increasing shareholder power to intervene [in the affairs
of the corporation] would improve corporate governance and enhance shareholder value by addressing
important agency problems that have long afflicted publicly traded companies."). My proposal differs
from that of Professor Bebchuk in that I call for a very limited notion of shareholder empowerment:
specifically, the power to elect a federal regime of corporate governance. Along those lines, it is
noteworthy that because I call only for a single additional shareholder power my proposal does not
implicate arguments that management's business judgment would be inappropriately impaired. First, the
selection of the chartering authority has nothing to do with managing the business of the corporation.
Second, the depoliticized agency I advocate would be limited to those innovations founded upon
corporate governance science and these innovations would be subject to market testing. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1735, 1744-46
(2006) (arguing that management must have the power to make non-reviewable business decisions).
270
[W]lithout shareholder intervention power, management's monopoly over the initiation of
rules-of-the-game decisions might well result in inefficient corporate governance
arrangements. Considering that public companies often live long lives in dynamic
environments, management's control over rules-of-the-game decisions can produce severe
distortions over time. Shareholder power to make rules-of-the-game decisions would address
this problem. It would ensure that corporate governance arrangements do not considerably
depart from the ones that shareholders view as value-maximizing.
Bebchuk, supra note 26, at 838.
271
Ramirez, supra note 135, at 986 (explaining that shareholder primacy, limited liability,
and the ability to lock-in capital free from claims of shareholders (or their creditors) operate to maximize
the flow of capital from passive investors to productive enterprises).
272
Professor Bebchuk includes a detailed proposal regarding submissions, management
counter-proposals, holding period requirements, expense reimbursement, limitations on resubmission,
and the like. Bebchuk, supra note 26, at 870-75. A full assessment of such procedures is beyond the
scope of this Article, which seeks merely to spotlight and resolve the problems of special interest
influence over corporate governance and the need for a depoliticized agency to align corporate
governance standards with corporate governance science. In general, Professor Bebchuk's framework
appears thoughtful and appropriate and would seemingly function as well in the context of my proposal
as in his. It is notable that Professor Bebchuk points out that other nations (including the United
Kingdom) already have such mechanisms in place for empowering shareholders. Id. at 847-51.
273
It may well be that, in general, it is highly appropriate that a depoliticized agency structure
have a market foundation for its creation and continued existence. In other words, Congress would only
part with such power on a durable basis if markets force it to do so, or if Congress is confident that a
check on the agency's power is manifest through market action. Either way, relying on market
assessments of corporate governance standards is central to my proposal for the institutional framework
advocated herein. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper,Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for
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option of setting the authority for corporate governance would likely impose
real constraints on managers even if shareholders rarely exercised such
rights. 274 Like a well-oiled shotgun has deterrence value even if never fired,
275
such an option would deter expropriation and reduce agency costs.
Moreover, other jurisdictions, particularly Delaware, would likely respond to
optional federal threats
with greater attentiveness to a more even-handed
276
corporate governance.
An agency similar to the Fed could bring to bear the kind of expertise to
corporate governance that the Fed applies to monetary policy. 27 7 Monetary
policy is not debated in Congress, much less in state legislatures or state and
federal courts. 7 8 Monetary policy is instead the subject of intense debates in
financial markets around the world and among economists at the Fed. 2 79 Law
review articles do not debate whether the Fed should raise or lower the discount
rate. 28° Indeed, there is no monetary policy law, and, for the same reasons,
there should be no corporate governance law. 281 Corporate governance

FederalCorporate GovernanceInitiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 384 (2005) (advocating
that corporate law scholars think about the institutional context in which rules are made as much as the
content of rules themselves).
274
Just as Delaware acts to prevent federal preemption threats, management would act to
reduce threats posed by alternatives to their own choice for incorporation. Jones, supra note 86, at 663.
275
For example, there is evidence that management rarely listens to shareholders even when
they make their preferences clear and even when the shareholder preference seemingly would add value
to the firm. Bebchuk, supra note 26, at 868-71. Naturally, management can presently ignore shareholder
preferences if shareholders have no recourse, except of course to sell and invest in another firm that will
ignore their preferences; if management risks a major disruption to their prerogatives they would be
more responsive.
276
As Professor Bebchuk highlights, if shareholders have autonomy in the selection of
corporate governance regimes, then states would have new incentives to cater to shareholder
preferences. Id. at 868-69. Delaware appears to endeavor to maintain its position as the state of
incorporation of choice for public companies. See Jones, supra note 86, at 662-63 (concluding that
Delaware law shifted to prevent federal preemption).
277
See generally Ramirez, supra note 22.
278
Professor Heminway has assessed the institutional expertise of the federal courts with
respect to corporate governance law:
Certain federal judges have been or are well versed in corporate and securities law, including
corporate governance issues. But many have no such expertise. In fact, the securities
regulation and corporate governance expertise of the federal courts specifically has been
questioned on a number of occasions, and there is evidence that the Supreme Court is not
confident in its own competence to handle corporate governance matters. The lack of expertise
of the Supreme Court in securities regulation and corporate governance may reflect, at least in
part, the small number of business law cases it has decided relative to the number of cases it
has decided in other subject matter areas.
Heminway, supra note 273, at 304. Many maintain that Delaware has superior expertise, yet it acts
without regard to the empirical science on the issues it addresses. See supra notes 203-221; see also
supra notes 63-69.
279
See supra notes 263, 265.
280
In this respect, I take the fundamental point of Professor Heminway one step further. She
argues, correctly, that scholars should think not just about optimal legal outcomes, but the legal
institutions necessary to secure such outcomes. I posit that the institutional structure for corporate
governance of public companies should be optimized and never debated again--essentially the reality
today for monetary policy law. See Heminway, supranote 273, at 384.
281
See supra note 253 (stating general conditions for when depoliticization is appropriate).
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standards affect the operation of the key economic institution in the world.2 82

Corporations are the pivotal store of risk capital in the United States, and the
key holder of society's wealth. 283 The manner in which corporations are
governed will affect a wide range of national issues-from economic inequality
to globalization.
Like monetary policy, corporate governance is too
important to be left to politics and special interest influence.285 If left to an
expert administrative agency with interdisciplinary expertise, the science of
corporate governance could be incorporated into corporate governance
286
standards.
Until such an agency is created, the best learning regarding
appropriate corporate governance standards is likely to continue to fall on deaf
ears, or at least ears with insufficient expertise or too beholden to interest group
politics. 287
At first glance, creating such an agency for articulation of corporate

governance

standards

for public

companies

may seem

radical

and

undemocratic. 288 Yet, corporate governance rarely becomes a contested
election issue. 289 Indeed, politicians seem to work to keep such issues from
reaching any significant degree of political salience. 290 Moreover, the very

design of corporate governance assures that states like Delaware may have
influence over how capital is deployed nationwide, even though only the
citizens of Delaware have any voice in the substantive content of corporate

governance. 291 The citizens of Delaware have incentives to generate franchise
tax revenue, but little incentive to assure that corporate governance is optimized

282
See supra note 24.
283
Id.
284
Ramirez, supra note 135, at 1009 (arguing that an optimized legal infrastructure
surrounding the corporation could serve many broad societal goals, specifically including racial issues).
285
As Professor Heminway notes, Congress does have specialized committees and the ability
to hold hearings, which no doubt justifies some degree of deference to its fact-finding. Heminway, supra
note 273, at 271-76. Nevertheless, "highly specialized matters" such as corporate governance are outside
the "actual and potential expertise" of legislatures because of the time and expertise needed to address
such subjects in depth. Id.
286
As presently constituted it is not clear that the SEC has interdisciplinary facility with
regard to corporate governance science. See supra notes 28, 36.
287
The SEC, as a specialized administrative agency, no doubt has substantial expertise in
securities regulation. Heminway, supra note 273, at 284-91. Nevertheless, the SEC has been shown by
its own senior managers to be too beholden to interest group politics, particularly the lobbying efforts of
corporate managers and their minions. See supra notes 28, 51.
288
The Fed has, over the course of its history, come under attack for the degree of power it
wields free of political accountability. WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL
RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY 12 (1987) ("The Federal Reserve System was the crucial anomaly at the

very core of representative democracy, an uncomfortable contradiction with the civic mythology of selfgovernment. Yet the American system accepted the inconsistency. The community of elected politicians
acquiesced to its power.").
289
In fact, during the corporate corruption crisis of 2002, Congress acted quickly and in
unison specifically to avoid corporate corruption from being a campaign issue. Romano, supra note 13,
at 1566.
290
Id.
291
Cary, supra note 29, at 701 (arguing that Delaware, as a "pigmy" state, ought not to have
such power over corporate governance).

HeinOnline -- 24 Yale J. on Reg. 354 2007

Optimizing Regulatory Structures
in accordance with the best economic and financial science. 292 Under these
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that corporate governance standards are
sub-optimal. 293 The political system is custom-made for those with great stakes
in corporate governance-the CEOs of America's public corporations-to
dominate the content of corporate governance. 294 A depoliticized agency would
operate to shift power away from such interests and in the direction of
economic and financial science, which can be an excellent means of vindicating
the public interest in corporate governance. 295 'Understanding the astounding
costs of the current system and the real shift in power away from CEOs and in
favor of the public interest under my proposal is the key to understanding the
pro-democratic nature of the reform suggested herein. 296 Indeed, Professors
Butler and Ribstein
identify $1.1 trillion in unjustified net compliance costs
297
from SOX alone.
Other recent proposals for reform of corporate governance fail to
appreciate the fundamental problems driving both excessive compliance costs
and impaired investor confidence under the current regime, and the costs
imposed by this pernicious reality. For example, Professors Bebchuk and
Hamdani have recently proposed a standing federal commission to periodically
298
review corporate governance and make recommendations for improvements.
This proposal, which would address precipitous federal regulation, does
nothing to address inappropriate political influence. 299 So long as the standards
are subject to approval through political action (either through a politicized
SEC or a legislature) then history suggests that durable reform in terms of
shifting power away from incumbent managers will be difficult, if not

impossible. 300
Professors Butler and Ribstein advocate that federal efforts at reform be
made temporary, voluntary, and subject to sunset provisions. 30i This approach
does not allow for federal regulation of proven efficacy, such as the federal
mandatory disclosure regime.
There is now compelling empirical evidence

292
Twenty percent of Delaware's tax revenues are attributable to corporate franchise fees,
while most states gamer less than 1% of their revenues from this source. EISENBERG, supra note 39, at
202.
293
See supra notes 192, 193.
294
See supra Part I.
295
Ramirez, supra note 22, at 504, 553.
296
Supra Part I!.
297

BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at 3.

298
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1835-36 (2006).
299
See id. at 1799 (leaving Congress in command of corporate governance standards).
300
Arthur Levitt furnishes compelling testimony regarding the frustrated reform agenda he
pursued in the 1990s at the SEC and how political influence was at the crux of his failures. See supra
notes 28, 89. The PSLRA and the money contributed by those who benefited from the demise of private
securities litigation demonstrates the problem of any proposal relying upon the extant political process
for corporate governance reform. See supra notes 89, 92.
301

BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supranote 12, at 102.

302

See supra notes 172-177
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of the efficacy of the federal securities laws. 30 3 Professors Butler and Ribstein
also focus only on the shortcomings of federal regulation, while ignoring the
flawed system that creates the financial crises that lead to federal
intervention. 30 4 As previously shown, precipitous federal regulation is an
inherent element of inferior state corporate governance mechanisms.
Professor Romano continues to advocate for a market-based solution to
would ••
argue for extending "competitive
corporate governance;
•
,, • - indeed, she
•
305
While markets certainly are powerful
federalism" to securities regulation.
tools for allocating resources, they do not seem to imbue corporate governance
standards with any degree of precision sufficient to positively influence law
3 6
0 This isthe essential lesson from the race to the bottom
and regulation.
308
307ato. 3 6
i
I posit
debate.
Markets clearly value corporate governance, at least today.
that markets would respond to an expert agency insulated from politics to
signal a superior corporate governance regime. 30 9 Thus, my proposal would
signal an option for shareholders concerned about corporate governance at their
corporation.
Others seem satisfied with the status quo. 3 10 I have posited in the past that
absent compelling evidence of significant problems and effective solutions, the
status quo should prevail. 31 The empirical record today shows real
shortcomings in the current system, ranging from excessive regulatory costs to
too much concentration in the ownership of equity securities. 3 12 The cost of
equity capital is too high.3 13 Moreover, the Fed demonstrates the possibility of
complex financial regulation being insulated by law from inappropriate
political influence. 3 14 These factors justify a departure from the status quo.
Simply stated, inappropriate political influence is hurting investor confidence
while at the same time imposing high regulatory costs, and this problem should
be addressed.
All of this suggests that a depoliticized agency for corporate governance is
both possible and likely to be effective. It is possible because there is a
compelling economic case for a more rational legal structure for the

303

See supra note 172.

See supra note 77.
304
305
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES
REGULATION 3 (2002).

306
See supra notes 79-108.
307 Id.
308
See supra note 102.
309
Signaling is the ability of well-informed agents (such as the agency proposed herein) to
improve market outcomes by providing valuable information at a cost to ill-informed agents. See
Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 358 (1973).
310
See supra note 86.
311
Ramirez, supra note 49, at 1066 n.35.
312
See supra notes 12, 226-228.
313
See supra notes 16-21.
314
See supra notes 22, 25.
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promulgation of corporate governance. 3 15 Cororate governance law has
yielded corruption crisis after corruption crisis. 316 Globalization means that

other nations will strive to optimize their legal infrastructure. 3 17 If the United
States continues to allow politics and regulatory obsolescence to dictate a
fundamentally pro-CEO approach to corporate governance, then other nations
are likely to discover more optimal means of articulating corporate governance
standards in order to seize a competitive advantage. 31 8 These would be
effective because, in the end, experts protected from special interests and
steeled by market tests would invariably outperform rent-seeking state
lawmaking organs and federal legislatures 319 and regulators beholden to
management interests. 320 The question is not whether corporate governance

315
See supra Parts 1, 11.
316
Between the summer of 2002, with its parade of corporate scandals, and the summer of
2006, with revelations of a widening options scandal that former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt called the
"ultimate in greed," was the Refco public offering fraud of the fall of 2005. See Ramirez, supra note 8,
at 359. Refco was the largest independent futures broker in the United States. Its CEO concealed $430
million in debts that he owed Refco through entities he controlled, leading to his indictment for
securities fraud. The Refco public offering would have triggered the full applicability of the SarbanesOxley Act, but only after the company consummated its public offering. The SEC had regulatory
authority over the Refco public offering and its securities brokerage units. Grant Thornton audited the
firm's books in accordance with the new Sarbanes-Oxley regime governing audits of public firms.
Numerous underwriters and other professionals (including the attorneys) would have been subject to the
"due diligence" requirements of the federal securities laws. Still, despite all of this oversight, millions in
debts owed by the firm's CEO were not discovered until after the public offering. One expert concluded
that "[t]here is no way you can rely on an auditor or an investment bank for a seal of approval or a
guarantee of no chicanery ....The lesson to be learned from Refco is that you must do sleuth work
yourself." Id.
317
See supra notes 225-226 (showing that nations around the globe have the incentives and
opportunities to optimize corporate governance).
318
China has already demonstrated an ability to achieve remarkable growth by finding
alternatives to the American system. See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 126
(2002) (stating that China's economy is "directly opposite" to the market fundamentalism prescribed by
the United States through the International Monetary Fund).
319
Among the interest groups that may influence congressional deliberations are associations
comprised of businesses with joint or overlapping rulemaking interests, industry or trade
groups, professional associations, and other business interest organizations (e.g., the Chamber
of Commerce and the Business Roundtable). In fact, many observers assert that business
interests have disproportionate influence in American politics because of their strong
representation in U.S. interest groups. Interest groups representing accounting and business
interests are widely credited with defeating a proposal (made in the early 1990s) to expense
stock options.
Heminway, supra note 273, at 315.
320
See id. at 319-27 (assessing influence of interest group politics on the SEC and finding
that SEC is subject to the same influences as Congress, but may also be a captured agency) (citing Frank
Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of "May", 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1280
(2003) (noting that "[p]ublic choice scholars looking for recent examples of agency capture will feast on
the SEC's" rulemaking under Section 401 of SOX regarding disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions,
which the SEC diluted under pressure from business executives, financial interests, corporate law firms,
and the accounting industry) and Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. at Odds on Plan to Let Big Investors Pick
Directors, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at Cl ("The paralysis at the agency [regarding proxy reform] is a
major victory for corporate executives who have fought to kill the rule and a setback for labor
organizations and institutional investors who have pushed for years to get the commission to adopt it.")).
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regulatory structures will be optimized, but rather by which nation in response
to what financial crisis.
IV. Conclusion
Corporate governance in the United States suffers from a flawed legal
structure that yields deeply suboptimal results. The SEC is subject to the
distortions implicit in a politicized regulatory agency. Legislators show little
capability or desire to achieve optimal corporate governance standards. Courts
seem to guess at the best corporate governance outcomes rather than rely upon
the best financial and economic science available. In short, the reason why
corporate governance in the United States diverges from the optimal corporate
governance emerging from economic and financial science is because there is
no mechanism at present to assure that optimal corporate governance standards
prevail. Thus, the current regime yields unnecessarily high compliance costs
and impaired investor confidence simultaneously.
There is little evidence that any market for corporate governance is
operating to move standards toward optimal outcomes. Investors seem not to
bring material corporate governance law into their investment decisions. Our
history of corporate federalism is pocked with instances of special interests
holding decisive power, not any concept of optimality. More importantly it is
now clear that capital markets are yielding unsatisfactory outcomes in terms of
corporate governance. Indeed, permitting unbridled CEO power to reign in
corporate America, as it does today, is inconsistent with any principled
economic view of how corporate governance should function.
Rather, it appears the only market functioning to define corporate
governance is the market predicted by public choice enthusiasts with respect to
regulation and legislative action generally. CEOs have superior resources and
organizational capabilities. They have incentives to undertake collective action
designed to assure that their interests prevail over the general public interest.
Lawmakers are beholden to the views of the powerful and the organized, and
there is neither an investors lobby nor any general economic growth lobby.
Outcomes are decisively in favor of CEO power, with little legal constraint.
Even in the wake of financial disruptions, CEOs seem to always prevail, at
least with patience. At both the federal and state level, corporate governance
outcomes seem best explained by special interest influence, accompanied by
transient disruptions triggered by financial crises.
This Article attempts to articulate a new kind of corporate governance
regulation. The goal is to create an authority with the power to articulate
corporate governance standards in accordance with the best corporate
governance science available. Such an agency can be structured to resist special
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interest influence, just as the Fed is so structured. This agency would use
markets to optimize corporate governance in accordance with real shareholder
primacy, because shareholders would have the power to choose corporate
governance regimes for their corporation. Shareholders would be empowered to
vote to switch to an optional federal incorporation regime. This would preserve
the advantages of the corporation while yielding superior outcomes in terms of
corporate governance standards. No longer would courts of law, legislatures,
and politicized agencies have sway over this important area. Instead, science
and markets would be vested with decisive influence. Lawyers would be
limited to refining the system that produces corporate governance standards
instead of corporate governance law. Corporate governance law would become
as relevant as monetary policy law.
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